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Abstract 
Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben each identified a radical 
transformation of political subjectivity in the modern world stemming from a blurring of the 
traditional distinction between humanity’s biological existence (zoē) and the citizen’s 
qualified, political existence (bios). The form of politics that emerges from this indistinction 
is referred to as ‘biopolitics’, with the correlating deployment of political power and 
technologies being referred to as ‘biopower’. Each thinker presents us with material spaces 
that represent a localisation or outworking of various forms of biopolitics. The relationship 
between space and biopolitics in the works of these theorists will be deployed throughout 
this study to interrogate the relationship between the modern nation state and areas of 
environmental, economic and social degradation referred to as ‘sacrifice zones’.  
The thesis begins with an historical account of the term 'sacrifice zone', discussing several 
examples of spaces that are referred to using this term. An overview is then given of the 
biopolitical frameworks and theorists that are utilised throughout the thesis. Hannah 
Arendt’s understanding of the connection between the politicisation of zoē and the 
development of the waste economy is then discussed in order to interrogate electronic 
waste dumps as biopolitical spaces. Giorgio Agamben’s work Homo Sacer is then used to 
consider areas of economic and social abandonment. The study concludes by offering an 
alternative reading of the inclusion of bodily life into politics where the presentations of 
bodies in the public sphere can become the grounds of political resistance rather than 
simply subjugation. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is an analysis of areas of environmental, social and economic abandonment 
known as ‘sacrifice zones’ considered through the lens of biopolitical theory. While 
biopolitics is often concerned with issues around the deployment of political and medical 
techniques in the incorporation of the biological existence of populations into the 
machinations of the state – whether through public health programs, eugenics, or biometric 
surveillance – I will be utilising biopolitical theory in its broadest sense; that is, an analysis 
based on a particular type of political subjectivity that collapses the traditional demarcation 
of the citizen’s life as a political entity and their life as a pre-political biological entity.  
This analysis draws on a handful of theorists whose work is deployed throughout the thesis. 
In particular, Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Walter Benjamin. Each 
of these theorists offers a differing historical account of the development of biopolitics 
(indeed, only Foucault and Agamben use the term explicitly), and yet each account helps to 
illuminate the relationship between sacrifice zones and national and geopolitical legal 
structures in different ways.  
I begin by giving a historical overview of the term ‘sacrifice zone’ as it has developed since 
the late 1980s, beginning with areas surrounding ageing nuclear reactors, then expanding to 
describe inhabited areas contaminated by industrial pollution, and finally expanded further 
yet in recent years to include areas of economic and social collapse within affluent nations. I 
argue that the connection between these terms is not simply a linguistic coincidence, but 
rather that each type of sacrifice zone is bound together by the nature of their relationship 
to the state and economic system of which they are a part. This relationship is one of 
abandonment where the state withdraws itself from a particular geographic location and 
removes from these places the types of care associated with belonging to a political 
community or territory. 
I then move on to describe the different formulations of biopolitical theory that are 
deployed throughout the study with a particular emphasis on Foucault, Agamben and 
Benjamin. In doing this I introduce an argument that I return to at length in Chapter Three, 
that the relationship between sacrifice zones as territory mirrors Agamben’s account of the 
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way in which lives are subjected to law through their capacity to be abandoned and stripped 
of their political and moral status.1 Furthermore, those within sacrifice zones can be seen as 
prime examples of this type of legal abandonment, where they are included into the state 
but only by way of their political, economic and social exclusion from it.  
In Chapter Two I focus on Hannah Arendt’s account of the collapse of the traditional 
distinction between our political and animal existence as well as the way in which this 
development altered both the nature of politics as well as our fundamental relationship to 
the world. In particular, I focus on Arendt’s account of how these shifts led to the 
construction of the consumer society and, as an extension of this, a waste economy.2 I then 
argue that the ever-expanding electronic waste sacrifice zones of Africa and Asia can be 
seen as a direct outcome of the rise of the consumer society. However, I also argue that 
these sacrifice zones develop as the result of the technologies that people in affluent 
societies depend on for participation in the public sphere and the creation of a public 
identity. Such a way of constructing a public realm necessarily involves the dehumanisation 
and subjugation of those who are sacrificed to our waste. This deprivation of a whole class 
of humanity for the sake of the possibility of a public persona for members of a privileged 
class mirrors Arendt’s account of the way in which the life of the citizen of the Athenian city-
state was dependent on the relegation of women and slaves to the obscurity of the 
household to live a less than fully human life3.  
In Chapter Three I turn to the work of Agamben to look specifically at areas of social and 
legal abandonment. In particular, I focus on the race dynamics endemic in these areas. For 
Agamben, life enters into politics through its exclusion, that is, through the law’s power to 
set outside of itself and to remove the protections of belonging to a political community. 
Social and economic sacrifice zones represent precisely this dynamic in their capacity to 
strip individuals of their legal, political, and moral significance; to be bound to the state only 
by way of their abandonment by it. These social and economic sacrifice zones, like all 
sacrifice zones, tend to be inhabited primarily by ethnic minorities (particularly Indigenous 
peoples) and are, I argue, one of the ways in which the state seeks to solve a fundamental 
                                                 
1 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 81–82. 
2 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 126–8. 
3 Arendt, Human Condition, 30–31. 
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‘biopolitical fracture’ within the population.4 The biopolitical fracture that Agamben refers 
to is the problem that minority ‘peoples’ pose to the modern state’s project of forming a 
single people or ‘biopolitical body’ out of the population. This has particular significance for 
colonial states that struggle to incorporate pre-existing Indigenous polities into the super-
structure of the colonial legal system. Sacrifice zones, I argue, can be read as attempts to 
quarantine minority peoples in order to construct a singular People. Furthermore, the 
degradation that those within sacrifice zones are exposed to produces further justifications 
for their incorporation into the state. The state then presents itself as a necessary 
alternative to minority and Indigenous forms of political community.5      
I conclude in the final chapter by offering the possibility of a redemptive picture of the 
inclusion of bodily life into politics. I begin by looking at the ways in which the body can be 
seen to be acting as the site of political resistance rather than just subjugation. In doing this 
I draw on the work of theologian Rowan Williams who seeks to sketch an outline of human 
rights based on the recognition of the body as fundamentally communicative and the site of 
meaning making.6 I argue that this picture of the body can allow us to embrace life as a 
fundamental political category while seeking to eschew the sacrificial tendencies so 
intimately entwined with the incorporation of life into law and politics. 
                                                 
4 Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 32–33. 
5 Mark Rifkin, “Indigenising Agamben: Rethinking Soverignty in Light of the ‘Peculiar’ Status of Native Peoples,” in Agamben 
and Colonialism, ed. Marcelo Svirsky and Simone Bignall (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 79–80. 
6 Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 157–8. 
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Chapter One 
Sacrifice Zones as Biopolitical Spaces 
 
1.1 National Sacrifice Zones 
'You can’t have a system built on sacrificial places and sacrificial people unless intellectual theories 
that justify their sacrifice exist and persist.’  
– Naomi Klein1  
 
 
In 1988 New York Times journalist Keith Schneider wrote an article highlighting the 
challenges faced by the US government in responding to the complex issue of 
decommissioning the aging nuclear facilities that made up its 46-year-old nuclear armament 
program.2 At the time of the article there were at least 80 sites scattered throughout 27 
states including radioactive labs, mothballed processing buildings and dormant nuclear 
reactors. These facilities ranged in size from small nuclear waste storage cribs to some of 
the largest concrete structures ever built.3  
One of the complications faced by the US Energy Department in dismantling these facilities 
was that many of the older weapons manufacturing facilities coming out of the Manhattan 
Project in 1942 were designed and constructed without plans for redundancy and 
subsequent dismantling.4 This meant that novel processes needed to be devised for their 
dismantling that would avoid spreading further contamination through the dispersal of 
radioactive dust particles into the atmosphere. The standard solution employed involved 
the construction of gigantic aluminium or plastic domes over the entire facility while each 
piece of concrete, glass, wiring, and piping was cut into manageable sizes and placed into 
sealed containers to be sent to an approved storage site. At times facilities were so 
dangerously contaminated that workers were unable to be within close enough proximity to 
                                                 
1 Naomi Klein, “Let Them Drown: The Violence of Othering in a Warming World,” London Review of Books 38, no. 11 (June 
2, 2016): 11–14. 
2 Keith Schneider, “Dying Nuclear Plants Give Birth to New Problems,” New York Times, October 31, 1988, United States, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/31/us/dying-nuclear-plants-give-birth-to-new-problems.html?pagewanted=all. 
3 Schneider, “Dying Nuclear Plants.” 
4 Schneider, “Dying Nuclear Plants.” 
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perform these tasks themselves and so remote controlled heavy machinery needed to be 
specially designed.5 Once the buildings themselves had been dismantled and removed the 
contaminated top soil would then need to be dug up and either sent to a storage site or 
buried under several hundred meters of concrete or earth. The estimated cost of this 
process for all the sites intended for decommissioning was approximately 200 billion USD.6  
Due to budgetary restrictions as well as jurisdictional disagreements between state and 
federal governments the decommissioning of many sites was halted indefinitely. Faced with 
few other options the Energy Department began to simply erect fences around 
contaminated areas and post guards and warning signs outside the sites.7 The areas 
contained within these fences began to be known by engineers working within the 
department as ‘sacrifice zones’.  
Throughout the 1980s the term sacrifice zone became popularised as these areas 
abandoned to radioactive contamination became politically contentious due to the growing 
ecological conservation and nuclear disarmament movements. Furthermore, reports began 
to emerge of communities around arms manufacturing plants experiencing 
disproportionately high levels of illness associated with exposure to radioactive substances 
and other chemicals used in weapons manufacturing. Many families expressed concern that 
the soldiers within local military bases seemed to be wearing protective respiratory gear 
while only hundreds of meters away their children were left to breath the same air 
unprotected. In years following, the US government would go on to confirm that the 
production of nuclear arsenals did indeed have a negative impact on the health of the 
populations surrounding the manufacturing sites and was indeed responsible for a number 
of deaths.8  
While initially the term sacrifice zone referred to a specific geographic location where 
territory was being sacrificed (i.e. left unable to be utilised for other purposes), sacrifice 
zone began also to refer to the residential areas around these sites that were potentially 
                                                 
5 Schneider, “Dying Nuclear Plants.” 
6 Schneider, “Dying Nuclear Plants.” 
7 Schneider, “Dying Nuclear Plants.” 
8 Steve Lerner, Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United States, Paperback edition 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012), 3.  
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affected by contaminated air, water or soil. As such, an ambiguity arose in relation to just 
what was being sacrificed: segments of the population; territory; or both. 
In his book Sacrifice Zones: The Frontlines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United States, 
community organiser and public intellectual, Steve Lerner, undertook a survey of a dozen 
areas within the United States that were referred to as sacrifice zones, and the political 
struggle against polluters faced by the communities within these areas. Lerner gives an 
account of the shift in the usage of sacrifice zone from a term referring to areas abandoned 
to radioactive contamination due to arms manufacturing to a more general term to describe 
the ‘environmental high-impact areas’ and ‘fence-line communities’ that are 
disproportionately affected by hazardous levels of pollution caused by all manner of 
industry.9  
While Lerner’s work highlights many legal victories of communities ravaged by chemical 
contamination, many other communities face ongoing challenges in utilising political or legal 
means to hold heavy polluters to account. In particular, the populations within industrial 
sacrifice zones tend to be highly dependent on the polluting companies for employment.10 
The effect of this is that many workers are unwilling to risk their employment by speaking 
out and will sometimes simply rationalise away the risks associated with prolonged 
exposure to contamination. This unwillingness to jeopardise personal financial security by 
speaking out is further compounded by the likelihood that workers within highly polluted 
areas will either have health issues themselves that require expensive medical treatment or 
be caring for family members who have such conditions.11  
According to Lerner, the 1980s saw a shift in the public consciousness around the issue of 
pollution and chemical contamination due largely to a growing awareness of health issues 
related to chemical exposure and also the underlying class and race issues that were 
represented within these areas.12 Just as in the case of the Cold War, sacrifice zones where 
territory was abandoned in order to ensure national security and global hegemony, in the 
case of these industrial sacrifice zones described by Lerner, populations were sacrificed in 
                                                 
9 Lerner, Sacrifice Zones, 3.  
10 Lerner, Sacrifice Zones, 7–8. 
11 Lerner, Sacrifice Zones, 7–8. 
12 Lerner, Sacrifice Zones, 4–6. 
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the name of economic growth. These areas expose people of lower socioeconomic status to 
a disproportionate burden of the harmful effects of the production of goods and energy, 
while minimising the burden on middle- and upper-class people who themselves consume a 
disproportionately high level of the energy and goods being produced. Within the context of 
the U.S. this dynamic has led many activists and theorists to frame the issue of chemical 
exposure as one of civil rights, such as in the 1987 pioneering study entitled Toxic Waste 
and Race Relations in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic 
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites13 which opened the way for a 
plethora of studies over the subsequent decade on the relationship between race and class 
and chemical exposure. According to a compilation of 17 studies from this period, African 
Americans were 79 percent more likely to live in heavily polluted communities than white 
Americans, and Hispanics were almost twice as likely to live in heavily polluted 
communities.14 Furthermore, in areas where legal action was taken against polluting 
companies the fines imposed on polluters in predominately white communities were more 
than five times as high as those in communities comprised primarily of ethnic minorities. 
These race dynamics have lead many activists and researchers to speak of an intimate 
connection between sacrifice zones and what is often referred to as ‘environmental 
racism.’15 
One of the most prominent race and class issues associated with sacrifice zones is their over 
representation in areas inhabited by Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the production 
of sacrifice zones frequently involves the violation, and often outright destruction, of sacred 
or culturally significant sites as well as the displacement of Indigenous peoples from their 
land. For example, within the Australian context nuclear testing and waste storage in the 
Maralinga area during the 1950s and 1960s exposed local Aboriginal communities to 
dangerous levels of radiation.16 Furthermore, having already been exposed to radioactive 
contamination these communities were then forcibly removed from their land where they 
                                                 
13 Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of Christ, “Toxic Wastes and Race Relations in the United States: A National 
Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites,” 1987. 
14 Robert Doyle Bullard, Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color (San Francisco: Sierra Club 
Books, 1994). 
15 Bullard, Unequal Protection.  
16 Peter N. Grabosky, Wayward Governance: Illegality and Its Control in the Public Sector (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology, 1989), 235–53. 
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had been living a ‘semi-traditional’ existence and resettled thousands of kilometres away 
into prefabricated settlements.17 
While Indigenous communities are frequently threatened with being reduced to sacrifice 
zones through nuclear waste storage, today fossil fuel extraction is by far the most common 
cause of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities being referred to as sacrifice 
zones in both journalistic writing and environmental research18. In particular, mountaintop 
removal – a process whereby the peak of a mountain is exploded in order to gain easier 
access to coal seams – and hydraulic fracturing – fracking – for coal seam gas deposits, are 
among the most common industrial practices associated with sacrifice zones; mountaintop 
removal, because of its capacity to fill the atmosphere with potentially hazardous particles 
as well as its desecration of landscapes often considered sacred to Indigenous peoples, and 
fracking, for its recorded capacity to poison drinking water. As Naomi Klein writes in This 
Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate: ‘Running an economy on energy sources 
that release poisons as an unavoidable part of their extraction and refining has always 
required sacrifice zones – whole subsets of humanity categorised as less than fully human, 
which made their poisoning in the name of progress somehow acceptable.’19  Indeed, 
Indigenous activists have long recognised that the sacrifice of their communities could only 
take place under the assumption that Indigenous peoples were not fully part of the moral 
community of the rest of the body politic and therefore worthy of less moral consideration 
than members of the ethnic majorities of the nations that they inhabited.20 This has led 
many writers on the environmental issues around fossil fuel extraction to talk in terms of 
‘energy colonialism.’21 Just as the exploitation, eradication, displacement, and confinement 
of the Indigenous peoples of the ‘New World’ was seen as a necessary (even if regrettable) 
process for the expansion and economic development of European empires or colonial 
settlements, the creation of sacrifice zones on Indigenous lands communicates a willingness 
to privilege dominant ethnicities and cultures over First Nations peoples.22 
                                                 
17 Grabosky, Wayward Governance, 235–53. 
18 Danielle Endres, “Sacred Land of National Sacrifice Zone: The Role of Values in the Yucca Mountain Participation 
Process,” Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 6, no. 3 (2012): 329. 
19 Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate (London: Allen Lane, 2014), 310. 
20 Susana Batel and Patrick Devine-Wright, “Energy Colonialism and the Role of the Global in Local Responses to New 
Energy Infrastructures in the UK: A Critical and Exploratory Empirical Analysis,” Antipode 49, no. 1 (2017): 3–22. 
21 Batel and Devine-Wright, “Energy Colonialism,” 3–22. 
22 Klein, "Let Them Drown."  
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In recent years, the term sacrifice zone has been expanded further yet to include areas that 
are not necessarily abandoned to chemical exposure or environmental degradation but 
those that have been abandoned by the state socially, economically and legally. In his book 
Days of Destruction, Days of Revolt, journalist Chris Hedges, along with cartoonist Joe Sacco, 
surveyed of a number of such zones throughout the United States.23 Within these areas law 
and order had all but disappeared, employment opportunities were virtually non-existent, 
widespread narcotic use and its social corollary prevailed, and sexual violence and 
exploitation were rampant. In some areas no funds were available even for basic public 
services such as animal control and therefore packs of wild dogs roamed the streets and 
were known to attack unaccompanied children.24  
Typically, these places were not previously areas of social and economic degradation. Rather 
they were areas where communities had been based around a small number of industries 
that subsequently become unprofitable and had either shutdown or moved to areas with 
cheaper labour (often in the developing world). Within these socioeconomic sacrifice zones 
the industries or commercial interests that remained tended to be extractionary or 
exploitative in nature, such as the cannibalising of existing infrastructure to be sold as scrap 
to foreign companies, as well as prostitution, fast food outlets, and stores selling alcohol.25  
What the withdrawal of political, legal, and economic care from these areas represents is 
the creation of territories within wealthy industrialised states where the state all but 
vanishes except in instances of sporadic state violence. In this sense, they are more akin 
either to land that has been ceded by the state, or foreign land that has been occupied by it.  
While these differing uses of the term sacrifice zone (i.e. populations or territories exposed 
to environmental degradation, and areas abandoned to economic and social decay) each 
designating a distinct historical, material, and social reality, there is a unifying structure 
common among them. They all represent a type of abandonment of a geographical region 
within a state by the state’s own political-economic order.26 Furthermore, this 
                                                 
23 Chris Hedges and Joe Sacco, Days of Destruction, Days of Revolt (New York: Nation Books, 2012), xi–xv. 
24 Hedges and Sacco, Days of Destruction, xi–xv. 
25 Hedges and Sacco, Days of Destruction, xi–xv.  
26 Though as we shall see in the following chapters, sacrifice zones are not limited to spaces internal to a nation state and 
can be inflicted on foreign nations or populations by the economic and industrial practices of more affluent societies. 
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abandonment is justified as being necessary for the maintenance of the economic status 
quo, whether it is due to the chemical exposure necessary for the production goods and 
energy on which the economy relies or the free movement of capital in the pursuit of 
cheaper sources of labour. However, there is an additional political function of social 
sacrifice zones that writers like Hedges point to which is the capacity of these areas to 
legitimise systemic race- and class-based power imbalances and inequalities within 
democratic societies. The presence of regions within a political community comprised of 
people of low socioeconomic status and racial minorities that are reduced to something akin 
to a state of nature reinforces to the public that such people are by nature unemployable, 
lazy, violent and lawless. As such, the lawlessness of social sacrifice zones, far from being 
indicative of the impotence of law, actually help to reinforce the necessity of the legal order 
in the public consciousness and as such can be read as disciplinary tools.  
My contention throughout this thesis is that the production of sacrifice zones is not simply a 
regrettable and incidental feature of contemporary economics and politics, but is instead 
tied to what can broadly be described as ‘biopolitics’, that is a set of political practices and 
ideologies that places humanity’s biological existence at the centre of law, politics and 
economics. This marriage of life and law, economics and politics will always produce 
sacrifice unless a more thick conception of what it means to be a living body can be 
embraced.27 In her 2016 Edward W. Said London Lecture, Naomi Klein stated that ‘you can’t 
have a system built on sacrificial places and sacrificial people unless intellectual theories 
that justify their sacrifice exist and persist.’28 What follows is an analysis of the different 
understandings and reifications of the subjection of life to law and the ways in which the 
ideological frameworks that these theories critique are used to justify the production of 
national sacrifice zones be they economic, social or environmental.  
1.2 Biopolitics and Biopolitical Spaces 
Theorists such as Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben have identified a 
radical transformation of political subjectivity in the modern world stemming from a 
blurring of the historical distinction between humanity’s biological existence (zoē) and the 
                                                 
27 I return to this point in my final chapter. 
28 Klein, “Let Them Drown.”  
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citizen’s qualified, political existence (bios). The form of politics that emerges from this 
indistinction is referred to as biopolitics with the correlating deployment of political power 
and technologies being referred to as biopower.29 While each theorist offers a differing 
historical account of the emergence of biopolitics, throughout their writings each thinker 
presents us with material spaces that represent a localisation or microcosm of various forms 
of biopower. Throughout this study I shall be analysing the ways in which sacrifice zones are 
manifestations of a politics where life becomes a focal point of economic and state power.  
For Foucault, the clinic and the prison provided the physical spaces necessary for the 
development of a new kind of human subject which would be amenable to both 
enlightenment rationality and the medical gaze.30 This new type of subject was then 
enclosed in these spaces where they could be incorporated into the calculations of 
biopower and emerging political technologies. For Arendt, the concentration camp and the 
modern factory were, each in their own way, a means of dissolving plurality (the political 
recognition of individuality) – and as such political subjectivity – in both the totalitarian and 
non-totalitarian worlds. The former by offering a space for the purging of impediments to 
the historical potentialities contained within humanity as a species, the latter by creating 
spaces for the harnessing of the labour power contained within the human species. 31   
For Agamben, life is incorporated into politics not simply through confinement within the 
bounds of a specific juridical order, but also through the capacity of the state to exclude or 
expel individuals from such orders. However, these subjects of state power are not simply 
excluded from the state but are simultaneously included and excluded.32 The paradigmatic 
case of this process for Agamben is the refugee, who when confronted with one of the most 
                                                 
29 Here I include Arendt among biopolitical theorists. Referring to Arendt as a biopolitical author may seem to be 
something of a misnomer. After all, Arendt herself did not use the term, nor were her concerns related directly with the 
themes one would often associate with the area of biopolitics such as medical ethics or genetic engineering. However, if 
we compare her theory of labour and the historical genealogy that she traces of the rise of the labouring society with 
Foucault’s understanding of the birth of biopolitics in both his College De France lectures and the first volume of his History 
of Sexuality, clear parallels can be seen. Indeed, Arendt’s argument throughout The Human Condition that labour has 
usurped the position of action as the highest expression of our humanity and that this has fundamentally altered our 
relationship to the world, mirrors precisely Foucault’s argument that the biopolitical age is marked by a new set of power 
relations based on the politicisation of humanity’s biological existence and the harnessing of the potentialities intrinsic to a 
population. In this Foucaultian sense of the term (developed in Chapter One) Arendt’s critique of labour is indeed a 
biopolitical one. Furthermore, Arendt does make a number of tangential connections between the development of the 
labouring society and the lebensphilosophies of the 19th and early 20th centuries particularly in her assessment of the 
historical materialism of Marx and Engles. 
30 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (New York: Random House Publishers, 1994), 4–5. 
31 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 1985), 438. 
32 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 107.  
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emblematic manifestations of state power, the border, is both excluded from that legal 
order while at the same time being confined by it in the form of a refugee camp. The camp 
itself takes the form of a localisation of this ‘exclusive inclusion’ by being at once outside the 
normal legal order of the state while also being a manifestation of its legal power and 
force.33 The biological life of the refugee within the camp is maintained, but they are denied 
the rights and privileges associated with the political life of the citizen. Here the refugee is in 
danger of being reduced to their sheer biological facticity which itself becomes the subject 
of law. Agamben refers to this condition of life exposed to law as ‘bare life’ and the camp is 
the physical manifestation of law’s power to produce this form of life.34  
The relationship between space and biopolitics in these works will be deployed throughout 
this chapter to introduce the theoretical frameworks deployed throughout the following 
chapters in analysing the relationship between the modern nation state and areas of 
environmental, economic and social degradation referred to as sacrifice zones.  
What follows is an analysis of the ways in which the theorists mentioned above understand 
the relationship between material spaces and biopower, or more specifically, the kinds of 
spaces that can be understood as embodiments as well as productions of biopolitical orders. 
In particular, this thesis argues that a biopolitical analysis of space emerging from each of 
the theorists mentioned above can be deployed to better understand sacrifice zones and 
how these areas relate to modern democratic political communities under the conditions of 
late capitalism.  
1.3 The Inclusion of Life into Politics 
‘…modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.’  
– Michel Foucault35 
 
For political theorist Giorgio Agamben, contemporary politics is marked by a tendency to 
reduce individuals to an animal-like existence through their exclusion from a political 
community. This process is exemplified in his work by the person of the refugee. Such 
persons are confronted by, and subjected to, law through national borders and yet the 
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power of law is applied to them precisely by their exclusion from a legal order.36 This legal 
and political abandonment of individuals and people groups has clear parallels with the 
abandonment of the kinds of geographical regions described above. As will be shown, 
according to theorists such as Michel Foucault, biopolitics emerges precisely at the point in 
history where population supersedes territory as the focal point of political power. 
However, Agamben’s theory of biopolitics enables a utilisation of biopolitical theory in an 
analysis of the relationship between political orders and territory and, as such, of sacrifice 
zones.  
In his work Homo Sacer Agamben gives an account of the way in which humanity’s biological 
life became a focal point of sovereign power. In doing this Agamben enters into dialogue 
with a number of theorist such as Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, and Michel Foucault. In 
particular, Agamben seeks to build upon (and depart from) Foucault’s understanding of 
biopower as formulated throughout a number of his works.37 Foucault, in the first volume of 
The History of Sexuality, argued that it was in the 17th century, with the emergence of a 
biological worldview and a novel understanding of humanity as a species, that a radical shift 
in the deployment of power emerged.38 Whereas traditional sovereign power was founded 
on a right to put its subjects to death, this new form of power was based on the 
maintenance and administration of life. Foucault referred to this form of power as ‘bio-
power’ or ‘bio-politics’. In Homo Sacer Agamben disagrees with Foucault’s account of the 
politicisation of life, arguing instead that life had already been politicised prior to the 17th 
century. Indeed, for Agamben, the incorporation of life into politics was as old as the 
sovereign exception, and had its roots in the pre-Graeco-Roman world. According to 
Agamben, while life was seen as being excluded from the political sphere as early as 
Aristotle, it was precisely by its exclusion that life became included into the realm of politics 
as an object of political power.39 After all, the walls that kept the barbarians out, and the 
houses that kept women and slaves in (all figures associated with biological life rather than 
political life), were foundational to the political sphere and were necessarily a political 
concern. This capacity of law to include through exclusion is central to Agamben’s 
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understanding of the nature of law and sovereignty, and is foundational to his critique of 
modern politics as nihilistic and based on abandonment.  
In both The Nichomachean Ethics and Politics Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of 
life, zoē (ζωή) and bios (βίος). Zoē is often translated as ‘mere life’ or ‘bare life’40 and 
designates humanity’s sheer animal existence. It is a form of life that all living beings qua 
living share in common – including plants, animals, humans, and gods. As Hannah Arendt 
puts it, zoē refers to ‘[humanity’s] metabolism with nature,’41 that is with our maintenance 
and reproduction of biological life as well as our inevitable deaths. In this sense, with 
regards to zoē, each human being is indistinct and possesses zoē in the same way and to the 
same degree as all others.42 
 In contrast to zoē stood bios – sometimes translated as ‘way of life’ or ‘qualified life’. Bios 
was understood to be a uniquely human form of life and was not intrinsic to life itself but 
was manifested through participation in a certain type of political community. Through such 
a community one was given the opportunity to demonstrate a unique, virtuous life through 
the performance of great deeds.43  
For the Greeks, human life stood in sharp contrast with the rest of the natural world 
because of its fragility and transience. Nature, on the other hand, was seen as essentially 
fixed (or at least cyclical) and eternal. Even non-human animals were seen to possess a form 
of immortality. Animals, unlike humans, were seen as purely zoē with no individual 
identities to lose or be forgotten. Simply through reproduction, the individual creature was 
understood to live on indefinitely through its species. Humans, however, aspire to present 
unique identities or life stories – to be known for who, rather than what, they are – yet the 
prospect of death and ultimately obscurity thwarts these aspirations. Through the polis the 
citizen could be a part of something that had a type of permanence and stability akin to 
nature. The polis provided both a context for the manifestation of the individual’s unique 
identity through great words and deeds, and secondly it provided a continuous community 
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41 Arendt, Human Condition, 42. 
42 Aristotle, Politics, ed. John Berseth, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2000), 1278b, 23–31. 
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where these deeds and words could be remembered. This aspiration to perform deeds that 
would become part of the fabric of the polis was ultimately the aspiration to immorality as 
well as an answer to the precariousness of zoē; it was the polis that made such immortality 
possible.44 
In particular, what made the polis so central to bios was its capacity to allow citizens to 
engage in its public sphere as free and equal parties. The public sphere of the polis was 
demarcated from all other spaces by its functioning on the principle of persuasion rather 
than that of violence. The polis stood in contrast with the oikos (household) which was a 
realm ruled over by a single patriarch who was required to utilise violence in order to 
guarantee the efficient production of the necessities required for the maintenance of zoē. 
Those whose life was restricted to the oikos, such as women, slaves and children, were 
denied the possibility of bios and were considered simply zoē and could not therefore live a 
distinctively human existence. Furthermore, those outside of the polis, the ‘barbarians’, 
were also considered as lacking bios. Even barbarian peoples whose technological or 
bureaucratic developments matched or exceeded those of the Greeks, such as the Persians, 
were relegated to the status of zoē as the political communities of such peoples were 
administrated through violence rather than persuasion. Consequently, the barbarian ruler 
was thought to rule their kingdom in a manner equivalent to the ruler of a household which 
reduced the populace of their kingdoms to the status of slaves.45  
For the Greeks, while bios and zoē were distinct ways of life, bios remained dependent on 
zoē. After all, it would be impossible to maintain a political identity while ceasing to exist as 
a living organism. However, the realm of politics where bios was manifest was not 
concerned with the matters of zoē (its preservation or reproduction) directly. Each citizen 
was responsible to provide for such needs through the oikos. These needs were seen as 
fundamentally non-political and were instead seen as matters of household management 
(economics). This distinction between the political and the economic or between our lives as 
citizens of a polis and our biological existence within a private sphere, endured throughout 
much of the history of political thought in the Western tradition.46 One of the central 
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features of the theories that will be deployed throughout the following chapters is an 
inquiry into the consequences of the collapsing of these fundamental political categories 
into one another.  
One of the questions that Foucault sought to address throughout a variety of his works was 
the way in which zoē rather than bios became the chief concern of politics, as well as the 
way in which the biological health, reproduction, and death of its citizens became the focal 
point of political systems. Sovereign power was founded on the right of the ruler to expose 
their subjects to death – a right that Foucault sees as emerging from the power relations of 
the patria potestas in Roman society (the right of the head of a household to kill his slaves 
and children).47 However, Foucault observed that by the 17th century this power had been 
dissipated and was limited to a means of self-preservation of sovereignty.48 The right to 
death was exacted only to punish those who threatened the rule of the sovereign either 
through seditious acts or treason. The sovereign could also legitimately call on their citizenry 
to be exposed to death (or the possibility thereof) through conscription into an armed 
conflict, but again this was seen as a means of preservation of the sovereign order and 
lacked the arbitrariness of patria potestas.  
According to Foucault, the power over life began to supersede the power of death with the 
emergence of two interrelated social phenomena; a mechanistic understanding of the 
human body and an understanding of humanity as species. The mechanistic understanding 
of the body enabled it to become an object of enquiry amenable to enlightenment 
rationality. This allowed its capacities to be measured, harnessed, and ultimately enhanced 
by its incorporation into industrial systems. This incorporation would become foundational 
to the development of industrial capitalism. The utilisation of this understanding of the body 
and its placement in an economic order led to a set of power relations that Foucault 
referred to as anatamo-politics.49 
                                                 
Graeco-Roman world, in historical practice there was indeed overlap in the areas of politics and life. For example parenting 
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Flowing out of this understanding of the body as machine was the related understanding of 
the body as an expression of the human species. It was this view that saw the body as the 
bearer of the forces that made life possible which would transform it from a mere individual 
object into a piece of data to be used in the statistical calculations of natality, mortality, 
longevity, hygiene, et cetera. This advanced the incorporation of the body into industrial 
systems by transforming the whole of the biological life of the population into an economic 
and political concern. By harnessing and manipulating the forces that were embedded in 
both body and population life could be both preserved and enhanced through the 
disciplined application of a new kind of regulatory control enabled by the development of 
the emerging fields of the social sciences and economics. Foucault referred to this shift 
towards the understanding of populations and species as the object of power as a 
‘biopolitics of population’.50  
According to Foucault, this form of power emerged with the diminishment of the traditional 
form of sovereign power. Whereas for classical sovereign power the central concern was the 
holding of territory, under this new biopolitical and disciplinary paradigm population 
replaced territory as the chief concern of the state. As such, if one was to look to Foucault’s 
model of biopolitics then the application of a biopolitical reading of the phenomena of 
sacrifice zones would be either paradoxical – a study of territory through a paradigm that 
negates the significance of territory – or such a study would have to limit its reading of 
sacrifice zones simply to the populations affected by them. However, Agamben’s alternative 
account of the incorporation of life into politics enables a much more fruitful analysis of the 
continuing significance of territory to biopolitics. 
In Homo Sacer Agamben seeks an answer to the origin of the incorporation of life into the 
sovereign order or ‘ban’ by uncovering the origin of ‘the dogma of the sacredness of life’.51 
He discovers this in the person of Homo Sacer, a figure from Roman law who, as 
punishment, had been stripped of all legal, political, and religious significance and could 
therefore be ‘killed with impunity but not sacrificed’.52 As will be shown, this utilisation of 
law to strip life of its legal significance parallels the creation of sacrifice zones within states, 
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and as such demonstrates a continuity in the relationship between sovereignty and life, and 
sovereignty and territory. 
1.4 The Inclusive Exclusion of Life from Politics 
‘It might be well worth while to track down the origin of the dogma of the sacredness of life.’  
– Walter Benjamin53 
 
In identifying the origins of life’s relationship to law, Agamben responds to Walter 
Benjamin’s assertion that such a task would require the uncovering of the origins of the 
sacredness of life. While Benjamin provided a thorough investigation of the mythic 
character of life’s exposure to the violence of law, Agamben demonstrates how this 
relationship came into being by relating Benjamin’s account to the work of Carl Schmitt in 
Political Theology. Schmitt famously asserted that ‘the sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception.’54 For Schmitt the sovereign stands in relation to the state in a manner similar to 
the relationship between God and his creation. While God sets up natural laws according to 
which creation ordinarily functions, it is within the power of the divine to suspend these 
laws temporally in the performance of miracles. In this sense, God is not bound by the laws 
that he constitutes. In the same way the sovereign is not established through law, nor is the 
sovereign bound by law, rather sovereignty is demonstrated precisely by the sovereign’s 
capacity to suspend law by creating a state of exception.55 While Benjamin’s focus is on 
inclusion of life into law through its exposure to state violence, as we shall see, for Agamben 
life’s foundational relationship to law lies in the potential withdrawal of law from life in the 
form of a legal abandonment in the sovereign exception.  
In Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” he presents a vision of state power where violence is 
utilised by the state, not as a means to achieve just ends, but in order to manifest and 
maintain its own power. Under such conditions human life is reduced to what he refers to as 
‘mere life’ where the body can be called on to become a means through which the power of 
the state is realised.56 Benjamin refers to this set of insidious power relations as ‘mythic 
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violence’.57 The mythic order can be traced back to the stories of antiquity where 
transgressions of invisible boundaries by individuals led to violent appearances from the 
gods, a theme Agamben picks up in his analysis of the refugee camp. The blood spilled from 
the transgressor became a symbol of the power and presence of the gods. In the same way 
the state utilises violence to create and maintain its legal power and parameters and mere 
life becomes the sign of this power over the individual. Benjamin sought to conceive of a 
type of violence that would rupture the mythic order and enable the formation of 
alternative forms of political life. He referred to this kind of interruption as ‘divine 
violence’.58 The goal of divine violence is to establish justice and then to withdraw. It does 
not seek to institutionalise itself, but dissipates in the one violent moment.  
In “Critique of Violence” Benjamin was searching for an answer to the violence of the mythic 
order. In response to the bloodletting of the 20th century many chose to respond to the 
violence of the state by embracing pacifism. Kurt Hiller, for example, rejected the utilisation 
of violence in order to establish a just world order, choosing instead to embrace and affirm 
life and existence itself rather than happiness and justice: 
‘If I do not kill, I shall never establish the world dominion of justice… that is the argument of the 
intelligent terrorist… We, however, profess that higher than the happiness and justice of existence 
stands existence itself.’59  
Benjamin rejects such a notion, arguing that in this view ‘existence’ designates ‘mere life’ 
and as such is ultimately the affirmation of the body’s situation in a violent political order. In 
this sense, the apathy of the pacifist is a participation in the cycle of the mythic order. 
Benjamin was looking for a type of violent action that he calls ‘pure immediate violence’ 
that could break this cycle. However, Benjamin also points to a type of non-violent 
resistance that could achieve a rupture in the mythic order – the ‘general strike’. The 
general strike is non-violent because it does not simply attempt to extort particular 
institutions by withholding labour in order to force the provision of better conditions, but 
rather refuses participation in an unjust economic order altogether. In this way, the 
                                                 
57Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 294. 
58 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 294. 
59 Kurt Hiller, “Anti-Cain,” in Das Ziel: Jahrbücher Für Geistige Politik, Volume 3 (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff Verlag, 1919), 25. 
17 
 
proletariat is able to take control of the labour of their bodies and by doing so refuse to 
make their bodies locations of political and economic domination.60 
The relevance of the general strike to Benjamin’s theory lies in the fact that it embodies an 
extra-legal program of will formation and political resistance – the legal system itself being a 
manifestation of the violence of the state. The concessions in the law allowing strikes, for 
Benjamin, are simply an example of the state’s monopolisation of violence. In order to 
maintain the power of its legal system the state must insist on mediating between the 
conflicting ends of its subjects. This, in Benjamin’s view, is not done to increase peace or to 
provide a space for impartial mediation, but in order to produce and maintain power. By 
allowing strikes the state is not providing grounds for resisting the power of the legal 
system, but instead is ensuring that when collective action is performed it is performed by 
legal entities and, as such, perpetuates the subjection of life to law. By refusing to act as a 
legal entity one is refusing the condition of mere life forced on them by the mythic order. 
In order to explore further what Benjamin means by ‘mythic violence’ it is first necessary to 
examine the myth that he uses as his model for such a concept – that is, the myth of Niobe. 
Niobe was the queen of Thebes who, during a feast dedicated to Leto, boasted that she had 
fourteen children while Leto only had two. In response, Leto commanded her children 
Artemis and Apollo to kill all of Niobe’s children. Upon seeing all of his children killed within 
in a matter of minutes, Niobe’s husband committed suicide. Niobe herself wasn’t killed but 
was turned to stone and would weep for all of time.61 
According to Benjamin, the gods in this myth do not utilise violence in order to punish 
unlawful behaviour, but rather through committing violent acts they establish law – that is, 
they create a boundary for human behaviour.  Niobe did not break a law, but instead 
challenged fate and as such provoked the gods. By evoking an appearance of the gods Niobe 
reinforced the law-giving existence of the gods. The blood of her children serves as a symbol 
of the violent power of the gods, and through their blood the law-making presence of the 
gods is reinforced. 
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In a similar fashion to the gods of antiquity, the mythic violence of the state has two 
functions – to create legal institutions, and to maintain them.  Political regimes and legal 
institutions are established through conquest. When the conqueror grants ‘rights’ to the 
conquered they are not granting them freedoms but are in fact asserting their power by 
transforming them into legal entities (i.e. citizens). The law is then reinforced when the 
boundaries are transgressed and representatives of the state exact violence on the 
transgressor. The transgressor therefore does not undermine the law by transgressing it, 
but reinforces it by becoming an object of retribution from the state – by evoking a violent 
appearance of state power.62  
While Agamben agrees with Benjamin’s account of the capacity of law to utilise the body as 
the location of mythic violence, as well the archaic roots of the exposure of life to law, 
Agamben argues that the power of law is not maintained through the mere inclusion of life 
into law. Indeed, for Agamben law is as much concerned with keeping life outside of law as 
it is with incorporating it within a mythic order. This including and excluding power of law 
can be understood by examining the use that Agamben makes of the concept of homo 
sacer. 
The person of homo sacer is a relatively obscure figure taken from Roman legal tradition. 
Homo sacer or ‘the sacred man’ was one who could be killed with impunity by any citizen, 
yet could not be sacrificed. The adjective ‘sacred’ in this context seems somewhat counter-
intuitive. After all, that which is sacred tends to be that which can only be killed in a 
ritualistic context, or otherwise whose killing would be considered profane. However, as 
Agamben demonstrates the sacredness of homo sacer resides in their belonging to neither 
the realm of humans nor gods. Their killing can neither be classified as murder – the 
transgression of a law against homicide – nor sacrifice – the consecration of a life to the 
gods. The person pronounced to be homo sacer by the sovereign has been stripped of all 
legal, moral, and religious significance. This placing of a life outside of human community 
and, consequently, outside of law constitutes for Agamben an origin of the relationship of 
law to life. The rendering of life as sacred is a legal pronouncement of the abandonment of a 
life by law. This abandonment is literally the removing of a life from the sovereign ‘ban’ – 
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that is, to be banished or deemed a bandit.63 This process is structurally vital to Agamben’s 
account of biopolitics as it marks an inclusion of life into law through its exclusion.  
Paradoxically, homo sacer – the recipient of one of harshest fates possible in the Roman 
imagination – sits in relation to law in a manner that parallels that of the sovereign. Drawing 
on Schmitt, Agamben identifies sovereignty with the capacity to decide on the 
circumstances under which law no longer applies – that is, the situation that constitutes a 
state of exception. The sovereign resides outside of law, and yet the lawlessness of the 
sovereign is incorporated into the legal system. For Agamben, the exception marks that 
which is outside of the purview of the law, and yet the exception remains foundational to 
law even while residing outside of it. In this sense, the incorporation of life into law through 
its exclusion as the foundational relationship of law to life renders the state of exception not 
simply a hypothetical period of crisis in which law must be suspended but as an intrinsic and 
perpetual feature of politics.  
The relationship between the state of exception and the stripping of the legal significance of 
life can be seen in two historical institutions; the refugee camp and the extra-judicial 
military prison camp. In both instances we are faced with creation of spaces used to contain 
those whose relationship to the juridical order (of which the spaces are an extension) is 
deeply problematised. In the case of the refugee camp we see those whose belonging to a 
political community as bearers of legal rights has been ruptured by their displacement from 
their country of origin. Such people first encounter the power of the state through an 
attempt to transgress national boundaries and are forcefully excluded from the state and 
placed in an environment where their relationship to the state is purely negative; that is, as 
those who lack the legal status of citizen but are still exposed to the violence of the state 
through their enclosure in the camp.  
In the case of the extra-judicial military prisons such as Guantanamo Bay, we have a similar 
dynamic. These spaces represent the construction of space outside the legal boundaries of 
the nation states where (alleged) enemy combatants can be treated in a manner forbidden 
by the moral and legal norms enshrined in the US constitution. The inmates are stripped of 
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both the legal status as members of a political community as well as their fundamental 
human dignity. In this case the relationship between the prisoner’s loss of legal and moral 
significance and the state of exception is clear. With the declaration of the state of 
emergency following the attacks on the US in 2001 the state could justify its suspension of 
legal norms and the granting of extraordinary powers (particularly of surveillance and 
‘heightened interrogation’) and in doing so could reduce individuals to bare life. In doing 
this the state created sites where human lives could be stripped of both legal and moral 
significance through their placement in locations of state violence which were specifically 
engineered to exclude them from the juridical context through which their legal and moral 
significance could be affirmed. These camps – both prison and refugee – are, for Agamben, 
paradigmatic of the culmination of the inclusive exclusion of life from the sovereign ban in 
contemporary politics.64 
1.5 The Biopolitics of Sacrifice Zones 
As has been shown, Foucault, Benjamin and Agamben each offer differing accounts of the 
relationship between life and politics. For Foucault, the politicisation of life constituted a 
new epoch where the biological life of the population became the focal point of a new type 
of political power based on the administration and preservation of life. For Benjamin, life 
was incorporated into politics through the utilisation of the body as the location of the law-
making and preserving violence of the state. For Agamben, the relationship between law 
and sovereignty stems from the capacity of the sovereign to exclude lives from political and 
legal communities. Each of these models could offer a framework through which to analyse 
the phenomena of the sacrifice zone. 
If we were to take Foucault’s model, then we could analyse the sacrifice zone as an 
expression of the subsumption of territory by population as the focal point of political 
power. The degradation of the physical environment could be read as the ceding of territory 
in the name of producing the goods required for the maintenance and administration of life. 
However, the relative weakness of this account would be its lack of explanation of the effect 
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of these zones on the populations contained within – that is, these spaces are the negation 
of the state’s concern with the biological health of its population. 
Benjamin’s understanding of mythic violence offers an account of the necessity of 
abandonment of the social sacrifice zones. As stated previously, such areas are marked by 
the capacity of their de-humanising conditions to reduce populations to near lawlessness. 
The lawlessness of these areas then justifies the use of sporadic state violence, which in turn 
reinforces the necessity of the violence of the legal order. However, it is my argument that 
such areas do not constitute simply the inclusion of populations into a legal order through 
the utilisation of violence, but instead are best read as sites where law and political care 
withdraws itself. In this sense, they can best be understood as an inclusive exclusion of not 
just populations, but territory, by the state. 
While there are numerous ways in which these bipololitical theories could be deployed in 
order to analyse the phenomenon of sacrifice zones, in the following two chapters I shall 
focus primarily on just two; those of Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben respectively. 
Each theorist will be applied to analyse one specific form of sacrifice zone demonstrating 
the ways in which the emergence of national sacrifice zones can be understood as being 
structurally related to subjection of life to law and the ascendency of life as a foundational 
political category. 
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Chapter Two 
Hannah Arendt: Sacrifice Zones as World-Alienation 
One of the consequences of the growth of the middle class in China is the drastic increase in 
the production of electronic goods throughout South-East Asia.1 This has led to 
unprecedented amounts of e-waste being left in huge open-air dumping sites throughout 
China. It is estimated that this region produces approximately 16 million tonnes of e-waste 
per-annum, much of which is toxic.2 The environmental impact of these sites is increased 
exponentially by the small scale ‘backyard’ recycling businesses that pop-up around them. 
These businesses attempt to remove and refine the precious minerals contained within the 
waste using small furnaces. The smelting that is utilised in the recycling process produces 
incredibly dangerous emissions that contribute to overall carbon emissions, and therefore 
climate change, as well as to the proliferation of various types of negative health effects 
such as cancer even in the very young.3 However, this industry is not based on the increase 
of consumption within China alone, indeed an illegal trafficking network has emerged 
between wealthy Western nations and China where shipping containers full of e-waste are 
sent to these semi-legal backyard refineries for processing.4  
The economics of e-waste and the sacrifice zones it generates is relatively simple. As the 
middle class increases more people have access to an ever-increasing range of electronic 
devices that now mediate the way in which much of the world organises its social existence. 
These devices have an ever-diminishing life expectancy and ever more rapid redundancy 
which manufactures a demand for constant production and therefore waste. As such, the IT 
industry constitutes the waste economy par excellence. And yet it is also a waste economy 
built on the development of increasingly mediated and abstracted social relations. The 
demand for new smartphones, tablet devices and laptops is not generated by a mere 
Marxian fetishisation of the commodity, but by the very real social needs brought about by 
                                                 
1 Stephen Leahy, “China’s Booming Middle Class Drives Asia’s Toxic e-Waste Mountains,” The Guardian, January 16, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/16/chinas-booming-middle-class-drives-asias-toxic-e-waste-
mountains. 
2 Leahy, “China’s Booming Middle Class.”  
3 Leahy, “China’s Booming Middle Class.” 
4 Leahy, “China’s Booming Middle Class.” 
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the social isolation endemic in late modernity.5 Access to online social networks through 
electronic devices is one of the ways in which cultures are adapting to this uprootedness 
and alienation from local community and associations; the e-waste sacrifice zones of China 
are one of the ‘in-real-life’ manifestations of this need.   
Yet it is not only the afterlife of these products that produces sacrifice zones. The extraction 
process of cobalt, one of the main minerals used in the production of smartphone batteries 
and laptops has a notoriously high environmental and human impact. According to an 
investigation by Amnesty International, throughout the Democratic Republic of Congo 
children as young as seven are working in ‘artisanal mines’ for 12 hours a day with no 
protective clothing or gear.6 Repeated exposure to heavy amounts of cobalt is known to 
cause a raft of medical problems.7 More than half of the world’s cobalt supply is extracted 
through mines such as these with UNICEF estimating that approximately 40,000 children are 
being employed across the southern region of the country.8 Furthermore, investigators have 
heard countless stories from child labourers of abuse and extortion by private security 
personnel hired by mineral companies.9 While these small mining sites are nominally 
independent, their only option is to sell their minerals to the multinational companies that 
have a monopoly over the refining and exporting of cobalt.10 This arms-length relationship 
between the dehumanising conditions of the mines, the mineral companies, and the IT 
companies who use the cobalt to produce smartphones makes it incredibly difficult to hold 
any one group to account. And yet, through this industry we see a direct relationship 
between the social relations and the self-disclosure enabled by information technology and 
social media, and the exploitation and degradation of some of the most vulnerable people 
on the planet. 
Among the theorists best suited for analysing the relationships between consumer culture, 
social alienation, and the production of a labouring population deemed superfluous is 
                                                 
5 An analysis of the role of social media as an attempt to overcome the social isolation endemic in late modernity can be 
found in Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: Basic 
Books, 2011). 
6 “‘This Is What We Die For’: Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Power the Global Trade in 
Cobalt” (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2016), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR6231832016ENGLISH.PDF, 28–29. 
7 “This Is What We Die For”, Amnesty International, 6. 
8 “This Is What We Die For”, Amnesty International, 6. 
9 “This Is What We Die For”, Amnesty International, 33. 
10 “This Is What We Die For”, Amnesty International, 33–34. 
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Hannah Arendt. In this chapter I discuss Arendt’s conception of the consumer society and 
how this social condition arises out of the politicisation of the condition of life. For Arendt, 
the consumer society is coextensive with the waste economy in so far as it designates an 
economy built on the production of goods designed specifically to be used up either 
instantly or in the very near future.11 The consequence of this way of managing an economy 
is that it ruptures one of the fundamental conditions that have historically grounded the 
human experience: that is, worldliness. The world, for Arendt, is the artifice created by a 
political community throughout its history as the context in which a common life takes 
place. While the world can be made up of less tangible components such as laws, the 
physicality and material spaces of a shared world are central for grounding the shared 
experience of a community in a common world. Having a world comprised of impermanent 
consumer objects uproots the human subject from their connection to a historico-political 
community. This uprooting has the potential to lead to an abstracted, generalised sense of 
connectedness to the world, a political community, and humanity as a whole. This, in turn, 
leads to a sense of alienation, uprootedness and superfluity within the population which, for 
Arendt, is politically disastrous as these are – as she argues in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
– the preconditions for totalitarian domination.12 
In the instance of the sacrifice zone we see a very clear example of the dynamics of a politics 
centred around consumption and its disintegration of the world. Indeed, as will be argued, 
the sacrifice zone represents both a localisation and intensification of this process where 
segments of both the world and population become superfluous and can therefore be 
liquidated.  
I conclude this chapter by taking Arendt’s analysis of the world-alienation of the consumer 
culture further by relating it to the construction of ever-increasingly disembodied and 
virtual forms of political and social associations. This recalibration of the public sphere is 
itself dependent on a waste-based information technology and computer hardware 
industry. The waste built into this aspect of the economy is astronomical which in turn leads 
to the production of some of the worst examples of industrial sacrifice zones imaginable; 
entire communities built around smelting plants devoted to recycling computer parts for 
                                                 
11 Arendt, Human Condition, 126–7, 132–3. 
12 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 475–6. 
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precious minerals or cobalt mines which poison the water supply of Congolese villages and 
exploit child labourers. In this instance, we see key components of Arendt’s theory coming 
together in unexpected ways – a public sphere abstracted from a material world which itself 
causes the destruction of physical communities and even contributes to a threat to the 
stability of the earth itself. Additionally, we see a form of self-construction through social 
media platforms which depend on the reduction of segments of the global population to 
bare life. This, it will be argued, parallels Arendt’s account of the way in which Greek 
aristocratic culture allowed the construction of political identities only through the exclusion 
and dehumanisation of women and slaves. 
2.1 Arendt and Biopolitics: Disambiguation 
As has been argued in the previous chapter, sacrifice zones can be understood as an 
outworking of biopolitics. However, referring to Arendt as a biopolitical author may seem to 
be something of a misnomer. After all, Arendt herself did not use the term, nor were her 
concerns related directly with the themes one would often associate with the area of 
biopolitics such as medical ethics or genetic engineering. However, if we compare her 
theory of labour and the historical genealogy that she traces of the rise of the labouring 
society with Foucault’s understanding of the birth of biopolitics, clear parallels can be seen. 
Indeed, Arendt’s argument throughout The Human Condition that labour has usurped the 
position of action as the highest expression of our humanity and that this has fundamentally 
altered our relationship to the world mirrors Foucault’s argument that the biopolitical age is 
marked by a new set of power relations based on the politicisation of humanity’s biological 
existence and the harnessing of the potentialities intrinsic to a population. In this 
Foucaultian sense of the term (developed in Chapter One) Arendt’s critique of labour is 
indeed a biopolitical one.13 Furthermore, Arendt does make a number of tangential 
connections between the development of the labouring society and the lebensphilosophies 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries particularly in her assessment of the historical 
materialism of Marx and Engles.14  
                                                 
13 Although it must be stated that, while the thinkers agree on the significance of the politicisation of biological life, the 
conception of politics of the two thinkers are on several key points diametrically opposed.  
14 Arendt, Human Condition, 313. 
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2.2 Labour and the Politics of Life 
One way of understanding Arendt’s political theory is as an analysis of her contemporary 
context from two different directions. On the one hand, she looks back from the perspective 
of the Holocaust and the rise of the European totalitarian regimes, tracing a line through the 
history of Western civilisation in order to understand how it came to be that the political 
conditions of totalitarianism were possible. On the other hand, she works forward from the 
Athenian polis and the agonistic public sphere that she takes as her model. In the Athenian 
public sphere she sees a model of deliberative democracy where the individual citizen 
emerged from the darkness and obscurity of the household to present a public persona to 
the political community – a persona that was constructed by words and deeds befitting an 
aristocrat. Here, matters of political prudence, ethics, and truth were contested, and by 
participation in this discursive process – what Arendt refers to as ‘action’ – the citizen would 
express the highest manifestation of their humanity – participation in a public sphere 
through words and deed.15 In stark contradistinction to this was the totalitarian state where 
the plurality on which a discursive public sphere is based was dissolved and replaced with a 
conception of humanity as either the aggregation of statistical fluctuations to be managed 
and directed, or as an expression of an historical process such as the emancipation of the 
proletariat or the rise to supremacy of the Aryan peoples.16 Within the totalitarian state 
truth did not emerge through dialogue and careful interrogation, rather all truth flowed out 
of a single idea in the form of an ideology – specifically an idea about the nature of history – 
and this idea was then imposed on the population from above.17  
Under ordinary political conditions the population is protected from the relentless logic of 
ideology through common sense – that is, the acknowledgement that our experience of 
reality is shared by our political community or ‘world.’18 For this reason the totalitarian 
regime requires a rupturing of the individual’s relationship to the world and the common 
sense that it embodies. However, the atomisation on which the totalitarian state depended 
was not simply a construction or an achievement of the states themselves, but was 
something that needed to precede the formation of the totalitarian state (though these 
                                                 
15 Arendt, Human Condition, 181–2. 
16 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 470–2. 
17 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 468-9. 
18 Arendt, Human Condition, 208–9. 
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states became masters of intensifying and utilising this atomisation). Throughout much of 
her writing, Arendt is at pains to give an historical account of how European culture became 
uprooted from its connection to a particular political tradition as well as how its orientation 
towards, and connection to, the world was ruptured. It was these phenomena that Arendt 
sees as laying the ground-work for totalitarian domination and, disturbingly, why the germ 
of totalitarianism exists even within liberal political orders.19 
Throughout The Human Condition, Arendt gives an account of the way in which the Western 
mind was turned away from the existence of a common world as a means of gaining 
epistemological security, and either in on the self or upward towards a transcendental idea 
through which to understand history. For Arendt, it is the fact that the world is common to 
all – that it is simultaneously experienced by manifold subjects – that establishes in our 
minds its reality.20 A subject divorced from the world is cut off from this common sense and 
is therefore susceptible to the explanatory power of ideology. The lonely, worldless subject 
is then capable of being incorporated into the totalitarian vision of humanity as ‘one man of 
gigantic dimensions.’21 Under these conditions, the subject is reduced to what Arendt refers 
to as animal laborans – that is, a person who has been reduced to their sheer biological 
facticity who in turn must participate in the maintenance and reproduction of the biological 
life processes of the state through labour.22 In Arendtean terms the totalitarian society was 
one where the activity of labour and the corresponding condition of life were the organising 
principles. 
Labour, for Arendt, is one of the three basic activities that human beings engage in, along 
with work – the production of artefacts that contribute materially to the make-up of the 
common world – and action – collective political deliberation and praxis. These three 
activities each correspond to a series of mutually dependent human conditions or 
experiences. The corresponding condition to labour is life, or our ‘metabolism with 
nature.’23 The condition on which work is based is worldliness, or our orientation towards a 
common world that proceeds and exceeds our individual lives. And finally, the 
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20 Arendt, Human Condition, 208. 
21 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 466. 
22 Arendt, Human Condition, 129-30. 
23 Arendt, Human Condition, 98. 
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corresponding condition of action is plurality, that is the fact that we share the world with 
manifold individuals who each have their individual perspective on, and experience of the 
world. As Arendt says, plurality refers to ‘the fact that men, not Man, lives on the earth and 
inhabit the world.’24 
Within the Greek consciousness (particularly Athenian) there was a clear hierarchy between 
these three activities, with action constituting the highest and most uniquely human 
activity, and labour being the basest of the activities.25 Labour was denigrated below work 
not simply because of the intensity of the effort required, but because it corresponded to 
the condition of life which humans shared with all other animals. Those who were forced to 
participate in labour – that is, slaves – were considered less than fully human not because of 
some innate characteristic, but because they were denied the possibility of participating in 
action. The workers were esteemed more highly than labourers (and even within this 
category there was a hierarchy) because their activity produced the material context in 
which action took place (i.e. the polis).26 
Those who were privileged enough to become actors, that is citizens, could only do so 
because they were freed from the necessities of the maintenance of life through the labour 
of their slaves, wives and children. The realm of labour and the realm of action were 
demarcated by two material spaces – the household (oikos) and the city or public sphere 
(polis). The oikos was a realm devoted to the maintenance and reproduction of life and was 
governed ultimately by violence. Those relegated exclusively to this realm were considered 
to be limited to a mere animal existence. In contrast, the polis was governed by the principle 
of persuasion, where participants were set free from their bondage to the necessity of life 
and could engage in the fully human life of action.27  
The polis as a material space was vital to the active life, as the permanence of the polis as an 
artifice – in comparison to the frailty and transience of the life of the individual – meant that 
the actor could, through word and deed, contribute to, and be remembered by, something 
                                                 
24 Arendt, Human Condition, 7. This is in contrast to the anthropology and the philosophy of history of the totalitarian state 
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25 Arendt, Human Condition, 81–83. 
26 Arendt, Human Condition, 36. 
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greater than themselves. This was a vital component of the Greek aristocratic way of facing 
mortality.28 Indeed, it was the loss of the classical world’s hope in the polis as a means of 
achieving immortality that helped to overturn the hierarchy of labour, work and action. In 
particular, it was the political crises caused by the possible destruction of Rome, coupled 
with the emergence of Christianity and its hope for eternal life situated in a transcendent 
City of God, that deprioritised, or perhaps redefined, worldliness as a fundamental human 
experience.29 
This devaluing of, and disconnection from, the world in the European political tradition was 
a long process. Of particular note is Arendt’s account of how the rise of the empirical 
sciences in the late middle ages altered the Western mind’s relationship to the Earth itself. 
This reorientation had two related facets. Firstly, once Copernicus and Galileo established 
that sun and not the Earth was at the centre of the solar system a way of thinking emerged 
which saw it as necessary to think of the Earth from an external point of reference. In the 
Western imagination ‘the Earth’ ceased to refer to the part of the world that was ready-to-
hand, or one’s sensory experience of one’s particular standpoint, but the globe as perceived 
by some imagined extra-terrestrial stand point.30 This happened alongside, and was 
dependent on, a second set of phenomena, namely the invention of optics. Optics 
simultaneously provided the means for empirical verification of heliocentricism while at the 
same time helped to generate an epistemological culture that denigrated the human senses 
as a means of gaining epistemic security. This new understanding of the fallibility of the 
senses, and consequent valorisation of the tools created to overcome the limits of our 
senses, further disentangled ‘truth’ from appearance in European intellectual culture.31 The 
result of these developments in European intellectual culture was an abstracted relationship 
                                                 
28 This would seem like an unusual claim if one were to take Plato to be indicative of the Athenian understanding of 
personal identity. Plato’s understanding of the material and the bodily as somehow illusory in comparison to the soul or 
the idea is precisely an inversion of the dominant Greek understanding of the soul as only continuing on after death as an 
insubstantial shade who envies the living. A clear illustration of this view can be seen in Odysseus decent into hades and his 
encounter there with his fallen comrades.       
29 Arendt, Human Condition, 21. I say ‘re-defined’ because, as Arendt and many others argued the Church itself took on the 
function of a polity throughout Christendom. Though the subject inhabited both the Church and the Principality 
simultaneously. 
30 Arendt, Human Condition, 248–51. 
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between the individual subject and the Earth, as well as the world as a human artifice. This 
reorientation of the Western mind away from the world is a vital component of Arendt’s 
account of how the cultural and political conditions of totalitarianism, and the ascendency 
of life as a political category, came about. 
While Arendt gives a highly compelling account of how shifts in epistemology helped to 
generate the world-alienation on which a politics of life depends, she is adamant that we 
ought not to look simply to the history of ideas as explanatory tools for understanding 
political developments. Throughout both The Human Condition and The Origins of 
Totalitarianism Arendt gives an historical account of the uprooting of the populations of 
Europe and how this altered the nature of political identity, and ultimately, led to the 
ascendency of life as a political category.32 In particular, Arendt pointed to the expropriation 
of Church property by the state during the protestant reformation and the emancipation of 
the peasants during the late middle ages as disconnecting whole populations from their 
historical political communities as well as their geography. Furthermore, with the advent of 
the industrial revolution, labour became centralised around large urban centres and so 
populations, already experiencing generations of uprooting, began pouring into cities to 
participate in increasingly mechanised labour. Significantly, the nature of industrial labour 
became less and less dependent on individual skill or even competency as the process of 
production was broken down into smaller and smaller tasks. The core requirement for this 
new form of labour was the capacity to be integrated into the factory line. The result of this 
was a population made up of labourers who were not simply uprooted, but also – on the 
whole – interchangeable and finally superfluous.33  
Indeed, for Arendt the mentality associated with the factory as a means of utilising labour 
power is precisely the mentality of the totalitarian state. For the sake of efficiency, the 
designer of the factory must treat workers as objects that can be grafted into the industrial 
apparatus. In order for the factory to operate at maximum efficiency the individual labourer 
must be as physically uniform as possible. As such, the individual must conform to the 
contours of the industrial machinery rather than the system being adjusted to 
accommodate diversity. The aggregation of the labour power of the workers is then 
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harnessed by the industrial apparatus which transforms the plurality of individuals into 
Arendt’s ‘one man of gigantic dimensions’, which is a microcosm of the social conditions of 
the totalitarian state.34 
Of primary importance in this account of the changes in the intellectual culture and the 
material conditions of Europe was the development of a new way of conceiving of 
populations, peoples, and races. The industrialised nation state now had the conditions, 
both conceptually and materially, to conceive of the population or nation as a single living 
entity or organism.35 With this new organicist understanding of the state came a focus on 
the protection, maintenance, and reproduction of the biological life of the population. This 
led to the development and deployment of a number of political techniques and 
technologies focused on issues related to, for example, the appropriate use of sexual energy 
as well as genetic and racial purity. 
For Arendt, this change was akin to the transformation of the polis into an oikos which is 
coextensive with the subsumption of politics by economics.36 That is, the state became 
more and more concerned with the maintenance and reproduction of life which were once 
concerns relegated to the privacy of the oikos. As Arendt argues, to the Athenian mind the 
modern term ‘political economy’ would have constituted an oxymoron. The realm of the 
political and the realm economics operated on diametrically opposed principles. Politics 
began where freedom from bondage to the necessities of life ended. While this capacity of 
modern economics and politics to provide for basic needs had many positive consequences 
– not least the gradual emancipation of laborers from the dehumanising conditions of abject 
poverty – it fundamentally altered the nature of the political as well as political subjectivity.  
Arendt refers to these cultural and political changes as ‘the victory of the animal laborans.’37 
By this she means that the activity of labour and the condition of life are the primary 
organising principles of our society and the heuristic through which the health of a society is 
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judged. While this is a key part of her analysis of the political conditions of totalitarianism, 
Arendt’s account of the labouring society in The Human Condition was just as much a 
description of liberal democratic politics. One of the implications of the rise of the activity of 
labour as the central human activity is the development of ‘consumer societies’, that is 
societies built around consumption and production and, therefore, waste.38 This kind of 
society, Arendt warns, has the capacity to dissolve the public realm altogether and replace 
politics with the publicisation of private interests. In the next section I look at how e-waste 
sacrifice zones constitute a realisation of a waste economy, and are generated by the fact 
that we are attempting to manufacture a public realm of private interests. 
2.3 Arendt on the Consumer Society 
‘…the spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in anything but consumption, and the more 
time left to him, the greedier and more craving his appetites. That these appetites become more 
sophisticated, so that consumption is no longer restricted to the necessities but, on the contrary, 
mainly concerned with the superfluities of life, does not change the character of this society, but 
harbors the grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and 
annihilation through consumption.’ 
– Hannah Arendt39  
 
The condition of life, for Arendt, is marked by its fundamentally cyclical nature. As Marx 
posits, it refers to humanity’s ‘metabolism with nature’, that is the cycle of birth, 
reproduction and death, which humanity shares with the rest of the natural world. Labour, 
the activity associated with life, shares life’s circularity in its goal of providing for the basic 
needs of our biological existence.40 That is, labour produces items for the immediate 
gratification of the needs of life, which are to be used up shortly after their production. A 
society based around life and labour is, therefore, one that is sustained through a cycle of 
production and consumption. This is what Arendt refers to as a consumer society.41 
However, the fact that the consumer society is one where the condition of life and the 
activity of labour constitute organising principles does not mean that a consumer society is 
one exclusively focused on the production of food, medicine and reproductive technology as 
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one might imagine. Rather a consumer society is one where all activities, indeed all 
production, is treated and assessed as if were a form of labour.42  
As Arendt argues, within a consumer society almost all work is done for the sake of ‘making 
a living,’ meaning that its explicit or implicit goal is to provide a greater capacity to engage in 
consumption. This is not simply to say that labour has a dimension of monetary reward 
associated with it, but that its capacity to generate money for the purposes of consumption 
constitutes its telos or raison d'être. This is distinct from the classical conception of the need 
for an additional skill, namely the art of making money, to accompany professions such as 
architecture and medicine so that members of said professions could be freed from 
necessity in order to pursue the ends of their profession – that is, the construction of 
monuments or the alleviation of suffering. For the consumer society the art of making 
money and the art (in the classical sense of techne) associated with a given profession 
become intertwined from the standpoint of economics.43  
This shift in the way in which the modern world conflates almost all ‘paid work’ with labour 
can be seen in its lack of ability to conceive of any activity not associated directly with 
monetary reward as a hobby; that is a form of play.44 Play itself is bound to the condition of 
life as it designates pleasure experienced by the alleviation of the frustration and pain 
associated with the pursuit of life’s necessities. Even activities that have been, almost by 
their very definition, understood as transcending the realm of necessity – such as 
contemplation – can now be understood as part of the cycle of labour and leisure, and as 
such, a part of our metabolism with nature. It is at this point that Arendt critiques utopian 
labour theorists who saw, with the advent of mechanised labour, a possible future where 
humanity may be freed entirely from labour and therefore necessity.45 According to such 
theorists, under these conditions humanity would then be free, universally, to pursue our 
higher capacities such as art or philosophical reflection. However, Arendt argued that labour 
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power cannot simply be directed towards any other activity but must be bound to the 
condition of life and, therefore, to production and consumption. A population freed from 
production through ever more efficient mechanisation would need to engage in an 
equivalent increase in consumption to compensate for this alienation from production until 
the entire world becomes constituted by consumer objects.46 
For Arendt, alienation from the physical pain and exhaustion historically associated with 
labour through the mechanisation of production is connected to an increase in consumption 
and waste which in turn threatens to compromise humanity’s relationship to the world. As 
Arendt states: 
‘The rhythm of machines would magnify and intensify the natural rhythm of life enormously, but it 
would not change, only make more deadly, life’s chief character with respect to the world, which is 
to wear down durability.’47  
Among the chief characteristics of life is futility, that is, the bondage of all things to decay 
and entropy. One of the ways in which human beings experience this futility is through the 
physical hardship and pain associated with labour and toil. Phenomenologically, one of the 
consequences of a society more and more removed from the physical hardship associated 
with the condition of life is an alienation from its futility.48 However, a fully automated 
means of production, for Arendt, would not be an abolition of this futility as such, but an 
insulation from it within human experience, and the further intensification of the desire to 
consume. This, Arendt warns, would lead to an increase in the production of consumer 
goods, coupled with an ever-decreasing life expectancy for the goods produced. Here the 
consumer object takes on the very transience that marks the condition of life so that waste, 
almost as much as consumption, becomes a central feature of the consumer society. The 
consequence of this would be the diminishment of the world as a human artifice in which 
the qualified human life gains its intelligibility: 
‘The world, the man-made home erected on earth and of the material which earthly nature delivers 
into human hands, consists not of things that are consumed but of things of that are used [i.e. the 
products of work]. If nature and the earth generally constitute the condition of human life, then the 
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world and the things of the world constitute the condition under which a specifically human life can 
be at home on the earth.’49  
As stated previously, for Arendt our capacity to create a material world that gives meaning 
and stability to human existence is vital to a functioning public sphere and without such a 
world what it means to be human would be fundamentally altered. However, precisely what 
Arendt envisions when she describes the consumer society’s capacity to erode the world as 
a human artifice is not made explicit.  
One way of understanding the denigration of the world by the consumer society is 
ecological. That is, through our patterns of consumption and the waste generated by 
industrial production we could so compromise the ecosystem in which our world-making 
and common life takes place that our historico-political communities are simply no longer 
possible. For example, huge portions of the Earth that have been the home of ancient 
societies, where cities in which centuries, even millennia, of culture are embodied through 
monuments and architecture are in danger of quite literally being left uninhabitable through 
the disruption of the climate.50 This includes parts of Iraq which are predicted to be among 
the first urbanised regions of the planet to average wet-bulb temperatures of above 35 C – 
which is high enough to be lethal in only a few hours to anyone without access to air 
conditioning – with many Indian cities forecasted to follow shortly after. Furthermore, 
almost every major coastal city is now facing the threat of rising sea levels due to increasing 
water temperatures and glacial melting (again related to anthropogenic climate change). In 
these cases (and countless others) we see examples of a direct relationship between our 
cycles of production and the wearing down of the possibility of maintaining the material 
context for our common life – that is, our cities and urban centres.  
But there may also be a more subtle way of understanding the relationship between 
worldlessness and consumerism, namely through the transformation of the materiality of 
the world within the consumer society. Arendt insists that the world, in order to constitute a 
home for humanity, must be made up of the products of work – that is objects, to be used 
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and designed to have a semi-permanent place in the world. A world constituted by objects 
of consumption fundamentally alters what Arendt calls the ‘thing-character’ of the world.51 
One way of understanding what this might look like can be seen in anthropologist Marc 
Augé’s concept of the ‘non-place.’ A non-place is a configuration of space emerging out of 
what he refers to as ‘super-modernity’ and is marked by a heightened transience which 
resists attempts to assign significance.52 This observation was part of an analysis of French 
urban life in the mid to late 20th century when cities like Paris were actively seeking to 
maintain their distinct cultural and historical identities in the face of globalisation and trans-
Europeanism. Examples of non-places include chain hotel rooms, shopping centres and 
airports; all of which conform to patterns laid out by multinational corporations and tend 
towards the utilitarian. Furthermore, they are spaces designed to be moved through rather 
than to be inhabited. These spaces become a necessary part of the consumer society or 
‘super-modernity’ which is marked by the demand for ever increasing mobility of both 
bodies and capital. These spaces lack historical social reference points that reinforce a sense 
of belonging for those who inhabit them. To put it another way they are places that lack 
context and therefore historical meaning. This results in a sense of alienation and loneliness 
within the societies that centre themselves around these non-places. 
For the consumer society to sustain itself it requires the transience of a non-place. That is, in 
order to flourish it requires constant levelling and redeveloping of space so that it can 
maintain its cycle of production and consumption. As Arendt states: ‘Under modern 
conditions, not destruction but conservation spells ruin because the very durability of 
conserved objects is the greatest impediment to the turnover process, whose constant gain 
in speed is the only constancy left wherever it has taken hold.’53 An urban cityscape (for 
example) that seeks to maintain its historical character and cultural identity through limiting 
development would therefore be an enemy of production as it minimises the spaces in 
which the cycle of production and consumption can operate. However, for a city to 
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constitute a world (or what Augé refers to as ‘anthropological place’) it requires just this 
permanence and stability that is so at odds with the economics of the consumer society.54 
2.4 Sacrifice Zones as Both Microcosm and Globalisation of the Waste Economy 
As stated previously Arendt argued that the transformation of modes of production and 
consumption within the consumer society have the capacity to transform what it means to 
be human through alienating humanity from its world. However, Arendt also insisted that in 
her time the full reality of a pure consumer society had not been achieved and that the 
world as a human artifice remained as the material context of human life despite the 
threats posed by the political, cultural, and economic developments already discussed. And 
it is at this point that Arendt’s theory can be expanded.  Arendt evidently conceived of the 
consumer society as a self-contained political community or economy where production and 
consumption take place within the same society. What is missing from her account is the 
capacity of modern consumer societies to banish both production and waste outside of the 
bounds of the individual consumer society. Or to put it another way, in the modern world 
Arendt’s consumer society has ruptured the boundaries of the nation state and has been 
globalised, so that the process of production and consumption and consequent waste have 
been divided – with wealthy nations engaging in almost limitless consumption while those in 
the developing world (or poor areas within wealthy states) are inflicted with the pain of 
necessity and the disintegration of their world. It is here that Arendt’s theory is so pertinent 
to a critique of sacrifice zones. Sacrifice zones are microcosms of the disintegration of, and 
alienation from, the world that Arendt sees as an outworking of the consumer society, while 
at the same time they are mechanisms deployed by affluent late-capitalist societies to 
insulate themselves from the harshest consequences of their patterns of consumption.  
As argued in the previous chapter, the consequences of industrial capitalism in the form of 
sacrifice zones are always imposed on those who lack economic resources or political 
                                                 
54 Arendt, Human Condition, 252–3.  Arendt gives a description of the relationship between economic growth and urban 
redevelopment in her account of Germany’s post-war boom. Post-war Germany has often been described as a ‘miracle’ 
due to is rapid economic growth despite the devastation of most of its urban centres towards the end of the Second World 
War. However, this destruction created the space widespread redevelopment and therefore provided seemingly limitless 
employment opportunities for the working classes. ‘In Germany, outright destruction took the place of the relentless 
process of depreciation of worldly things, which is the hallmark of the waste economy in which we now live. The result is 
almost the same: a booming prosperity which, as postwar Germany illustrates, feeds not on the abundance of material 
goods or on anything stable and given but on the process of production and consumption itself.’  
38 
 
agency. This can be seen in both of the accounts of the consumer society’s world-alienation 
discussed above; the stripping of a place’s historical and cultural significance and the 
compromising of the ecosystems on which communities depend.  
The capacity of states to produce sacrifice zones that alienate populations from the cultural 
significance of their place can be seen very clearly in the desecration of Indigenous sacred 
sites by all manner of industries – though quite frequently fossil fuel industries – throughout 
the world.55 Within the Australian context there are countless examples of this process of 
alienation of Indigenous peoples from their world.  One recent example is the redefinition of 
the term ‘sacred’ in 2012 in the Western Australian Aboriginal Heritage Act 197256 to 
include only sites used for ‘religious practices’ rather than the previous, broader, definition 
as sites that are significant due to their relationship to ‘mythological story, song or belief.’ 
This led to the deregistration of 35 sites throughout Western Australia from the protection 
of the Aboriginal Heritage Act, which in turn made these sites vulnerable to desecration by 
mining companies.57 What such a move represents – among other things – is the attempt by 
colonial law to strip a land of the historical meaning assigned to it by Indigenous peoples 
and by doing so creating a non-place that can then be commodified to suit the needs of the 
colonising culture’s consumer society.  
What makes this example so pertinent to an analysis of the creation of non-places by 
consumer societies is the clear inequality between heritage laws for Indigenous and non-
Indigenous sites and the willingness to expose minority cultures to the negative 
consequence of industrial practices. In Western Australia, Indigenous sites are protected by 
the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 while non-Indigenous sites fall under the remit of the 
Heritage of Western Australia Act 1990.58 The Heritage of Western Australia Act 1990 came 
about after extensive lobbying by Western Australians who were concerned that sites of 
historical significance to the wider public were being compromised by industrial practices.59 
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There are clear imbalances to the protections afforded by these two acts. For example, 
interference with a non-Aboriginal heritage site under the Heritage of Western Australia Act 
1990 leads to penalty of a one million dollar fine and a possible sentence of two years 
imprisonment. However, under the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 desecration of an 
Indigenous site is punishable with the comparatively low fine of one hundred thousand 
dollars and one year of imprisonment. What these laws demonstrate is that ‘place’ as the 
embodiment of a shared history and cultural identity remains a concern for both Indigenous 
and colonial cultures. However, by both limiting the penalties for desecration of Indigenous 
places, and curtailing the sources of cultural significance that will be recognised by the state 
demonstrates that the relationship to place of the dominant culture is prioritised over that 
of those who have historically lacked political agency. By stripping these sites of their 
cultural significance the state is able to make room for the maintenance of the cycle of 
production and consumption on which the consumer society is based. 
The Australian consumer society has also recently been shown to be complicit in the second 
form of world disintegration discussed, namely the creation of waste sacrifice zones and the 
consequent destabilising of the environment on which communities depend. Australia is 
one of the biggest consumers of electronic goods in the world and therefore contributes 
dramatically to the production of e-waste and e-waste sacrifice zones. It is estimated that 
we produce approximately 600,000 tonnes of e-waste per year.60 While in recent years, laws 
have been created to ban the exporting of e-waste, no individual or corporation at the time 
of writing has been convicted under these laws.61 This has led to a vast illegal global e-waste 
trafficking network being utilised by large Australian corporations who pay contractors to 
remove their e-waste for ‘recycling’. These contractors then ship containers of e-waste to 
dumping sites all over the world where it is then burnt in makeshift smelters, often by child 
workers who are paid tiny sums of money for recovered precious minerals.62 Investigative 
journalists from the ABC recently discovered that computers from both St George and 
Westpac banks had been dumped in huge quantities in a site called Agbogbloshie in Ghana 
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which is the largest e-waste dumping site in the world.63 Within Agbogbloshie toxins from e-
waste have contaminated the soil with toxic metals including lead as well as cancer-causing 
chlorinated dioxins in quantities as much as one hundred times above safe levels.64 This 
contamination, along with contamination of water and the dangerous emissions in the 
atmosphere caused by smelting, has led to a raft of chronic medical problems throughout 
the population also including chronic nausea, diarrhoea, respiratory problems and skin 
lesions.65 
These e-waste sacrifice zones are highly relevant to Arendt’s account of the politicisation of 
life and the formation of the consumer society for several reasons. Firstly, and most 
obviously, they are an incredibly common, and highly dangerous, form of sacrifice zone and 
one related directly to patterns of consumption. Secondly, electronic goods are the 
quintessential consumer good according to Arendt’s account as they are goods made with 
redundancy built into them and, furthermore, are built and designed by companies that 
depend on the short life span of these goods in order to be economically viable. But thirdly, 
they are also goods that are created to facilitate a particular form of public and social 
existence through participation in online platforms. It is this creation of a public sphere 
divorced from place, and the form of political identity that this technology enables, that I 
shall now conclude by discussing. 
2.5 Manufacturing Plurality in the Consumer Society? 
As stated previously, Arendt saw one of the hallmarks of the transformation of politics in the 
modern world to be an indistinction between our biological life and our politically 
constructed identity as a member of a political community. This shift has altered the nature 
of the public sphere, the space where, historically, individuals have come together to 
engage in political action and in doing so express their own unique identity. The public 
sphere of the consumer society, Arendt tells us, is one dedicated to private interests – that 
is, the provision of the goods necessary for the maintenance of life. These interests are 
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private in the sense that they represent the pre-political interests that were once relegated 
to the household. Indeed, for Arendt under modern conditions the distinction between the 
realm of the private (or household) and the realm of the public (polis) has become blurred.66  
This understanding of the contemporary public sphere as one made up of private interests 
has great explanatory power when analysing the transformation of politics over previous 
decades with the advent of the internet and social media. And yet many of Arendt’s claims 
may appear counter-intuitive for those who study the cultural impact of social media. As 
social scientists such as Sherry Turkle argue, one of the great needs that social media fulfils 
for our culture is the ability to construct a unique identity and to present this identity to the 
world.67 In this sense, social media platforms seem to represent something like the public 
sphere that Arendt wished to reclaim, with the identities constructed through them 
representing something like the bios – or constructed political identity – that the consumer 
society is meant to have problematised.  
However, a closer examination of the nature of social media as a cultural phenomenon 
reveals that the nature of both the public sphere and the identity formation that social 
media produces fits very closely with Arendt’s critique of the labouring society. While social 
media does, to some extent, offer a capacity for a high level of self-expression, the 
platforms themselves generate revenue precisely through their capacity to reduce users to 
an identity derived from statistical patterns based on user activity. Once the user is 
categorised in this manner algorithms are then used to determine the types of content – 
including the types of people – that the user will be exposed to.68 This is done for two key 
reasons. Firstly, because research has shown that consumers will continue to use social 
media platforms more frequently the more their beliefs and tastes are reinforced. Secondly, 
by having vast amounts of data based on behavioural patterns of their users social media 
platforms can offer very precisely focused marketing research to advertisers.69 In this sense, 
while creating the appearance of plurality, from the perspective of social media companies 
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the identity of the user is fundamentally that of consumer, with the individual representing 
the mere expression of statistical fluctuations.  
One of the significant issues surrounding the nature of identity and social media is whether 
the content presented by a user is public or private. While most of what users present on 
their social media account would be of what is typically considered part of their private or 
social lives as opposed to political or professional lives – such as family photos, expressions 
of taste, personal opinion, etc. – over the last decade content presented on social media has 
become of direct interest to employers, the media, and even political parties. Employers 
routinely vet social media accounts of employees, the media constantly reports on 
controversial social media posts, and political parties employ advisors to trawl social media 
feeds to gain insights into the public opinion on various issues. In this sense, if online 
communities such as Facebook or Twitter constitute something like a public sphere, then 
they are very much a blurring of the distinction between public and private that Arendt sees 
as emblematic of the consumer society. 
This blurring of the line between the public and the private realms in the social media age 
has had a profound impact on the nature of political deliberation. Political philosopher 
Nadia Urbanati argues that because political leaders are now communicating directly with 
their ‘followers’ via social media, traditional political institutions and intermediary bodies 
such as political parties, as well as the professional press, are being corroded.70 Superficially, 
this immediate relationship between a political leader and their constituency appears to 
enable a more direct form of democracy. Furthermore, sources of news and information 
have become ‘democratised’ so that a small number of media companies who own printing 
presses can no longer control what the public sees.71 However, what the erosion of 
traditional intermediary bodies represents is an increasingly autocratic form of political 
leadership based around charismatic personalities. Politicians who manage to attract large 
followings via social media (often through making controversial statements) are able to 
present themselves as having a mandate directly from the people and therefore do not 
need to engage so much in the deliberative process that has historically been associated 
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with membership in a political party. Furthermore, the democratisation of news sources – 
facilitated by social media – has the capacity to effectively immunise populist leaders 
against falsification. By being so bombarded with alternative truth claims by countless 
sources of information a support base already primed to believe the statements of their 
political leader can easily choose news sources that suit their confirmation bias.72 These two 
elements – a direct relationship to leaders, and the democratisation of news – while having 
a seemingly democratic character make possible a highly autocratic form of political 
leadership; and it is precisely the blurring of public and private, or the construction of a 
public realm of private interests that gives rise to this form of politics. 
These developments in the way in which we create a public sphere have a direct 
relationship to both the creation of sacrifice zones and the subjection of life to politics. By 
creating this virtual public sphere where the public and private are merged, the consumer 
society has made necessary the production of e-waste sacrifice zones in which to dispose of 
the devices that make participation in such a public sphere possible. It is at this point that 
parallels with Arendt’s model of the Athenian public sphere can be seen. Just as in the case 
of the Ancient Greek city state, the construction of a public identity was only made possible 
by the subjection and dehumanisation of whole categories of people (e.g. women, slaves, 
and barbarians), the type of identity formation that electronic devices and social media 
enables is only possible through the creation of waste sacrifice zones and the consequent 
exposure of those who we implicitly hold to be less worthy of moral consideration to 
harmful chemicals and economic exploitation.  
Arendt described the rise of political economy brought about by the politicisation of life and 
labour as the expansion of the oikos to cover the entire political community. In the case of 
e-waste sacrifice zones perhaps this image could be adjusted. We have created a public 
sphere that enables a form of self-construction through the publicisation of our private lives 
so that the public now encompasses almost every aspect of society. The oikos, the realm 
marked by violent oppression and exposure to the toil and pain associated with life’s futility, 
has now taken the form of sacrifice zones that are kept away from the gaze of the public. 
The self-construction enabled by the consumer society is only possible through the denial of 
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the political and moral significance of the lives of those who inhabit the related sacrifice 
zones. This is a theme that will be expanded as we turn to the work of Giorgio Agamben. 
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Chapter Three 
Giorgio Agamben: Sacrifice Zones as Localisations of the State of Exception 
‘He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but 
rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, 
outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is literally not possible to say whether one who has 
been banned is outside or inside the juridical order.’ 
– Giorgio Agamben1  
 
3.1 Social Sacrifice Zones 
In Chapter One I introduced the various uses of the term ‘sacrifice zone’, beginning with its 
initial use to describe areas abandoned to radioactive and chemical contamination. The 
term was quickly expanded to include inhabited areas that were exposed to dangerous 
levels of pollution. This expansion of the term meant that the ‘sacrifice’ being referred to by 
the term ‘sacrifice zone’ was not simply that of geography or territory, but people as well. 
The term is now less commonly used to describe areas abandoned, not only 
environmentally, but legally and economically as well. Very often these sites are areas of 
‘urban decay’ where gradual economic decline has left cities or towns unable to finance the 
upkeep of its public utilities, where factories and other industrial sites are abandoned and 
begin to disintegrate due to disuse, and where law and order begins to break down due to a 
combination of an under-resourced law enforcement and legal system and dwindling 
employment opportunities. 
An example of an abandoned site that Chris Hedges gives in his book Days of Destruction, 
Days of Revolt is Camden, New Jersey. Camden is, per capita, the poorest city in the United 
States as well as the most dangerous place to live.2 The unemployment rate is estimated to 
be around 40 percent and the high school dropout rate is approximately 70 percent (with 
only 13 percent of students passing standardised maths tests).3 The city is also home to over 
a hundred open-air drug markets run by large crime syndicates such as the Bloods.4 In some 
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areas law and order is almost non-existent as the police force continues to shrink due to 
budget cuts (in 2010 the already comparatively small police force was to be halved).5 What 
police force remains faces ongoing problems with corruption, with a number of police 
officers being charged with assault, planting evidence, making false arrests and trading 
drugs for information from prostitutes.6 And yet corruption is not limited to the police force, 
over the last 20 years three mayors have been sent to prison. 7 Furthermore, in recent years 
a county prosecutor has been found guilty of misconduct forcing the state to drop charges 
against almost 200 suspects many of whom were years into custodial sentences.8  
Hedges describes the landscape of Camden marked by abandoned cars that have been 
dismantled and stripped of valuable parts, rows of gutted houses stripped of copper wiring, 
door handles and pipes (all of which is sold for scrap), and decaying factories and industrial 
sites.9 The only functioning industry left is the large sewerage treatment plant which is fed 
by the refuse of the rest of the state of New Jersey, and the huge waste burning facility that 
fills the atmosphere with dangerous particles.10  
Camden, New Jersey, is far from unique either in the United States or globally. Indeed, 
Hedges identifies Camden as a foretaste of urban life throughout post-industrial America.11 
As the industry on which local communities depend become unviable the areas around 
them are sacrificed and abandoned. These areas become states within states where the 
usual rights and privileges associated with belonging to a political community disappear. 
Public utilities are shut off, services close and the law all but vanishes except in cases of 
sporadic violence by an increasingly militarised police force.12  
What distinguishes Camden to Hedges as an example of an economic and social sacrifice 
zone is its size as well as its prosperous history (Camden was a thriving centre of industry 
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during the nineteenth century).13 However, examples of areas abandoned by the state to 
economic, social, and legal decay are numerous.  
One striking feature of these areas within colonial states is the over-representation of 
Indigenous communities, or communities made up of a disproportionately high Indigenous 
population.14 Hedges begins his study into US national sacrifice zones by looking at one such 
area in the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. Hedges describes this area as one of 
‘…these little shrines of death and profit, erected by tidy white capitalists.’15 Within the 
reservation there is around 80% unemployment, with almost half of the population living 
below the poverty line. The male life-expectancy is around 48 years with one in five girls and 
one in eight boys attempting suicide before the end of high school.16 The reservation faces a 
number of epidemics including diabetes, cardio-vascular problems, malnutrition, depression 
as well as alcoholism and drug addiction.17 Sexual assault is a near universal experience for 
women and girls growing up on the reservation, with a community leader stating that every 
family that she knew of had at least one case of child sexual abuse.18 As is the case in many 
of these kinds of sacrifice zones many families go without basic government services or 
public utilities such as power, gas, or even sewerage systems with many families relying on 
wood-fired stoves for heating and cooking.19   
Pine Ridge is one example of a pattern of extreme disenfranchisement of Indigenous 
peoples throughout North, South, and Central America as well as Australia and New 
Zealand. Such areas are a consistent feature of colonial states and, as I argue in this chapter, 
are a continuation of the violent appearance of colonial law manifest precisely by the law’s 
withdrawal from these sacrifice zones and the exposure of the lives within them to violence 
without recourse to legal rights. Furthermore, the existence of these Indigenous sacrifice 
zones is frequently used to fulfil a rhetorical function for the state, presenting these areas as 
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evidence of the unfished work of the colonial project and an impetus for reinforcing and 
advancing state authority over Indigenous communities.     
In this chapter I examine these types of sacrifice zones through the lens of Giorgio 
Agamben’s work Homo Sacer. In this work Agamben argues that sovereignty manifests itself 
in its capacity to produce bare life, that is a life stripped of its legal identity and yet 
vulnerable to state violence without recourse to the rights of a citizen of the state. Such 
figures are on the threshold of law, neither inside nor fully outside, caught in what Agamben 
refers to as ‘a relation of exception,’20 that is through its being included into the legal order 
only by its exclusion. I shall be applying this theory, in a modified form, geopolitically, 
suggesting that social, especially Indigenous, sacrifice zones represent a localisation of this 
threshold within states. Furthermore, I shall be examining how these areas can elucidate the 
relationship between sovereignty and Aboriginality as well as the ways in which discourse 
around Aboriginality is used to serve the state and justify the violent appearance of the 
state within Indigenous areas. As will be shown, unlike other forms of legal inclusion or 
exclusion, the state’s relation to the Indigenous populations that it lays claim to is 
complicated by the fact that the Indigenous population represents a pre-existing polity that 
must be included into the state and, as such, what is brought into the state through the 
dynamics that Agamben identifies are not simply individual lives, but whole cultures, 
languages, and histories. As will be discussed, this inclusion of Indigenous polity into the 
state is coupled with the simultaneous stripping of cultural, moral and religious significance 
that parallels the manner in which Agamben sees life being stripped of its significance 
through its relation of exception to the state. The Indigenous sacrifice zones are a reflection 
of this dynamic.   
3.2 Biopolitics and the State of Exception  
Within his work Homo Sacer Agamben sought to build on the work of both Hannah Arendt 
in her detailed critique into the juridical character and historical genealogy of the camp in 
the Origins of Totalitarianism, as well that of Michel Foucault in his analysis of the ways in 
which various types of power permeate through, and subjugate, the body and create 
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different forms of subjectivity.21 He develops these works not least by synthesising them 
through combining Foucault’s biopolitical analysis of power with Arendt’s analysis of the 
camp as the focal point of the totalitarian state. Indeed, Agamben argues that one of the 
oversights of Foucault’s work is that he neglected an investigation of the camp in his studies 
of biopower. Conversely Agamben saw Arendt as having failed to have sufficiently linked her 
analysis of the camp in Origins with her insights into the politicisation of zoē in The Human 
Condition.22 He builds on these theorists by arguing that the camp is the hidden matrix 
through which Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics and the subjectivity that state power 
seeks to produce converge and in doing so argues that the subjection of life to law - of 
which the camp is emblematic – is the foundational (in the sense of both a historical starting 
point and necessary condition) power-relationship in the construction of sovereignty.23  
Central to much of Foucault’s work is an inquiry into power and how it permeates 
throughout society as well as the body while eschewing the traditional modes of 
philosophical inquiry that focused its gaze on juridico-institutional questions such as “what 
is the state?” or “what constitutes a legitimate use of power?” Such questions, for Foucault, 
theoretically privilege the sovereign as the site of power as if power originates from this one 
location and emanates from there throughout the state and population.24 Foucault sought 
to analyse power in the concrete ways in which it interacts with human bodies and life. He 
does this through an analysis of political techniques and how they pertain both to the care 
for and management of the life of the population, as well as the processes by which the 
individual binds themselves to, and internalises, the state or other external powers. These 
two types of power, the objective, external, methods of control, and the subjective 
experience and internalisation by the individual of systems of power, are not utterly distinct 
and do converge at many points.25 Indeed, Foucault in his latter works conceived of the 
modern state as integrating these modes of power to an unprecedented degree. However, 
                                                 
21 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 2–4. Agamben follows this work of building on the work of Arendt and Foucault in many other 
works as well. 
22 This purported gap in Arendt’s theory is perhaps overstated by Agamben. While Arendt never explicitly describes the 
camp as a biopolitical instrument, she does link it to the totalitarian state’s need to flatten out plurality and to create a 
large organism-like social body. Indeed, the final chapter of Origins discussing the attempt by the totalitarian state to 
construct its ‘one man of gigantic dimensions’ out of the plurality of its people and the role of the camp in making this a 
reality could be read as running directly into what Agamben would call biopolitics in The Human Condition.     
23 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8–9. 
24 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976, ed. Mauro Bertani and 
Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 28–29. 
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as Agamben argues, Foucault’s program of a decentred analysis of power leaves open the 
question of precisely how and where the subjective and objective analyses of the 
deployments of power converge.26 
Agamben sees his work Homo Sacer as an attempt to build on Foucault’s work by focusing 
specifically on the intersection of the juridico-institutional and biopolitical modes of power 
culminating in a study of the camp as an embodiment of these power relations. Indeed, 
according to Agamben the inclusion of life into politics (biopolitics) constitutes the very 
foundation of sovereignty and, therefore, the juridico-institutional order. 
Agamben sees life as entering into politics not simply through methods of control or 
subjugation, but through its exclusion. This can be seen in Aristotle’s presentation of the 
distinction between life (zen) and the good life (eu zen).27 The polis is the means through 
which human beings have been enabled to pursue their telos constituted in communicative 
action and cooperation which in turn allowed the construction of self-sufficient 
communities and freedom from necessity. Life was then relegated to the obscurity of the 
household where the maintenance and reproduction of life took place. But this distinction, 
for Agamben, did not mean that politics and life, nor the polis and oikos, were antithetical, 
neither did it mean that politics and life operated independently; rather the very foundation 
of the polis and the form of life that it allowed was constituted precisely through the 
expulsion of life from the public sphere.28 As such, in both practice and theory, life enters 
into politics in the Western tradition by its very exclusion. This idea, that life enters into 
politics at the very moment that it is excluded, is foundational to Agamben’s analysis of 
biopolitics and shall be the focal point of this chapter’s analysis of the sacrifice zone.     
The paradoxical nature of the relationship of life to law-that it is included into the juridical 
order precisely through its exclusion- parallels the relationship between law and the 
sovereign themselves. This can be seen in the fact that, as Carl Schmitt highlighted in his 
Political Theology, the sovereign (for Schmitt, by definition) is the one who has the capacity 
to declare a state of exception and therefore has the power to decide when the legal norms 
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28 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7. 
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of the juridical order no longer apply. As such, through the mechanism of the exception the 
law contains within itself its own negation and, furthermore, manifests its most extreme 
ordinance at the very point when the law withdraws itself. Additionally, as well as deciding 
on the circumstances according to which legal norms no longer apply-typically some kind of 
state of emergency or siege-the sovereign also has the power to decide on the 
circumstances according to which laws can be applied. As Schmitt states:  
There is no rule applicable to chaos. Order must be established for juridical order to make 
sense. A regular situation must be created, and sovereign is he who definitively decides if 
this situation is actually effective.29 
In both these situations (deciding on when legal norms come into effect and when they are 
suspended) the sovereign stands outside of the law while at the same time being enshrined 
in it as a legal entity.          
For our purposes the centrality of the exception in the structural topology of sovereignty 
can be seen in the fact that whenever there is a relationship with the sovereign through an 
inclusion into the legal order, there is also a relationship to the exception. Once life enters 
into politics in to an unprecedented degree in the modern age as a justification for, and 
concern of, state authority, life also becomes the possible object of a relationship of 
exception. That is, once life enters into law it also becomes vulnerable to legal 
abandonment.  
3.3 The Sacredness of Life and the State of Exception 
An apparent impetus behind the Homo Sacer project was the shift in geopolitics that took 
place after the events of the 11th of September 2001. While Agamben’s observations 
concerning the topological structure of sovereignty and its relationship to the exception 
and, furthermore, the form of life that the sovereign exception produces, can be seen even 
in bronze age civilisations, ‘post-9/11’ geopolitics is marked by an emergence of the 
exception as the norm.30 One of the most prescient features of this exceptional form of 
politics is the production of forms of life that are uniquely vulnerable to various forms of 
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violence and violation that contradict norms enshrined in national constitutions and 
international human rights conventions. I shall now turn to investigate Agamben’s account 
of the way in which the inclusion of life into law by way of the exception relates to 
sovereignty.    
As mentioned previously, the relationship between the sovereign - manifest in its capacity 
to declare a state of exception - and the law parallels that of the relationship between law 
and life. And yet, there is a further connection between these sets of relationships. The 
inclusion of life into law by way of its exclusion is manifest most acutely, according to 
Agamben, within the sovereign exception. The form of life that is produced through the 
suspension of law in the state of exception, Agamben refers to as bare life. In order to 
interrogate the ways in which this form of life is produced, Agamben - following the work of 
both Schmitt and Walter Benjamin - looks to the religious and theological origins of ‘the 
dogma of the sacredness of life.’ Agamben finds these origins in the person of homo sacer 
from Roman law. According to 2nd century Roman grammarian Pompeius Festus this figure 
was one whom had been declared ‘sacred’ because of some crime and was therefore able 
to be killed by anyone without their killing being considered homicide. And yet the legal 
tradition also makes explicit that homo sacer cannot be sacrificed: 
The sacred man (homo sacer) is the one whom the people have judged on account of a 
crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned 
for homicide; in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that “if someone kills the one 
who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide.”31 
Here a third paradox emerges. The sacredness of homo sacer is marked by the permissibility 
of their killing, which apparently contradicts ordinary uses of the term ‘sacred’ which would 
imply that sanctions on the destruction or desecration of the sacred object, animal or 
human were to be upheld. This is further compounded by the fact that their killing cannot 
take place within in a cultic or liturgical setting (i.e. as a sacrifice), as one might sacrifice an 
animal that is of particular cultic significance in the worship of a certain god. And so the 
question comes to the fore, in what sense is the sacred man ‘sacred’?  
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Agamben’s answer to this question is that homo sacer is sacred in the sense that they are 
consecrated to the gods. Ordinarily for something to be consecrated means that it is - 
usually through a rite of purification - brought out of the human realm, and passed over into 
the realm of the divine. And yet, the life of homo sacer is included into the divine realm only 
by way of its exclusion from it, that is, it has a ‘relation of exception’ to the divine. Indeed, 
the life of homo sacer faces a double exception belonging neither to the human legal order 
(ius humanum) nor is it protected by divine law (ius divinium). The condemnation of homo 
sacer lies, therefore, not in infliction of state or religious violence, capital punishment or 
confinement but the placement of the individual outside of law.32  
This capacity of the law to abandon, to set outside itself in a relation of exception, is 
foundational for Agamben’s concept of biopolitics and marks the originary relationship 
between law and life. Agamben sees the production of this form of life as coming to the fore 
in modernity, particularly in the formation of universal claims concerning human rights. For 
Agamben, once rights became founded on the sheer fact of being a living human, rather 
than on the basis of belonging to a particular political community, an implicit decision had to 
be made concerning who would be included within the sphere of ‘humanity’ or ‘life worthy 
of being lived’, and who would be set outside of these categories and abandoned.33  
In the premodern Western tradition the fundamental political relationship was that of 
sovereign to subject. At birth two distinct identities emerged; a natural, creaturely life, that 
was subject only to God, and that of the political life of a subject of a sovereign. With the 
emergence of modern conceptions of the ‘inalienable rights of man’, and the 
transformation of political identity from that of subject to that of citizen (constituted by the 
mere fact of being born), these two forms of life, political and creaturely, became 
intertwined, or rather collapsed into one another.34 Once the life and natural birth of the 
citizen became the basis of their political identity and the legitimising principle of the 
juridical order, rights could be claimed concerning the maintenance and protection of 
natural life. The state was therefore mandated to deploy new political technologies to 
ensure the biological health of the population. This had wide ranging theoretical and 
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material consequences, not least of which was an implicit or explicit claim over the whole of 
the human life by the legal order. As Agamben states: 
‘It is almost as if, starting from a certain point, every decisive political event were double-sided: the 
spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always 
simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, 
thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they 
wanted to liberate themselves.’35  
Here Agamben identifies an inner-solidarity between bourgeois liberal democracy and 
totalitarianism. By making the protection and maintenance of biological life the impetus of 
the state these political communities inscribed every aspect of life with law and so the 
distinction between what was purely private or pre-political and what fell under the remit of 
the legal order became blurred. This, according to Agamben, is one of the reasons for the 
surprising rapidity with which democratic states transformed into totalitarian or fascist ones 
-  and indeed, the rapid transformation of totalitarian states into functioning democracies - 
the form of political subjectivity between the two forms of government are in continuity 
with one another.  
Once life became the basis for political subjectivity as well as the focal point for political 
power, life also became uniquely vulnerable to the possibility of the withdrawal of law from 
life and the creation of categories of life ‘unworthy of being lived.’ This was one of the 
central features of the Nazi regime who, in order to protect the biological health of the 
people, saw it as necessary to castrate those who might pass on illness (particularly mental 
illness) and to exterminate whole peoples in order to (among other things) ensure the racial 
purity of the German people.36 And here is where the camp comes to the fore as the 
quintessential site for the production of bare life. The camp is the localisation of the state of 
exception where life is stripped of the protection of the law and enters into a relation of 
exception to the sovereign.  
3.4 The Camp: Localising the Unlocalisable  
Agamben insists that the state of exception cannot be localised. This is because the 
exception is not bound by the territorial limits of the juridical order. Indeed, through the 
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declaration of the state of the exception the sovereign dissolves the binaries of 
inside/outside, chaos/rule, norm/exception. These binaries only become meaningful 
through the sovereign decision which declares when legal norms are in effect. And yet 
Agamben does grant the possibility of the exception taking on spatiotemporal limits. Here 
Agamben identifies the camp as an attempt to ‘grant the unlocalizable a permanent and 
visible localisation.’37  
The camp is only intelligible as a space through the juridical framework of the sovereign 
exception. They are simultaneously spaces where the juridical order is suspended, while at 
the same time being a physical manifestation of the juridical order’s hold over the natural 
life of the population:  
The paradoxical status of the camp as a space of exception must be considered. The camp is 
a piece of land placed outside the normal juridical order, but it is nevertheless not simply an 
external space. What is excluded in the camp is, according to the etymological sense of the 
term “exception” (ex-capere), taken outside, included through its own exclusion. 38 
From their entry into history the concentration camp was structurally related to the state of 
exception. Concentration camps were first utilised at the end of the 19th century by the 
Spanish during the Cuban War for Independence and the British during the Boer War. In 
both cases they were not used in accordance with regular legal norms, but instead came 
about as the result of the declaration of martial law.39 Within these conflicts the ordinary 
friend/enemy distinction of conventional politics and warfare was suspended and whole 
populations were stripped of legal protections and threatened with confinement. The 
situation of the camp within the juridical space of the exception is even more apparent 
when one looks at the juridical mechanisms deployed by the Nazis in the construction of the 
first camps and, ultimately the killing of those within. At first the confinement of Jewish 
peoples was enabled by the emergency powers granted by the Weimer Constitution and 
was presented as a form of ‘protective custody’ (Schutzhaft). This law granted the state the 
power to suspend the personal liberties granted to all citizens under normal legal 
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circumstances in order to protect the lives of the population during a state of siege. The 
state of exception which enabled the enactment of Schutzhaft would last from February 
1933 until the end of The Third Reich.40 As such, this period was one where the state of 
exception became the norm and the death camps were the material spaces that emerged 
from the exception.41 
But it was not just the spaces themselves that were placed outside of the normal juridical 
order, but also the individuals caught within. It was not a mere superfluous act of 
proceduralism that led the Nazi state to first strip the German Jewish people of their 
citizenship before performing their extra-judicial murder. Rather the denationalisation of 
such minorities was necessary for the very form of life that these camps were designed to 
produce; sacred life that could be killed and not sacrificed. Those within the camp became 
pure zoē exposed to the violence of the state while being placed outside of its juridical 
order.  
It is important to note here that Agamben does not see the camps, nor the horrors that 
happened within them as a mere historical anomaly, but were rather a particularly 
murderous application of the biopolitical developments that have their roots in political 
modernity. Once bare life became the object of political power and subjectivity, life 
necessarily entered into a relationship with the exception and so became vulnerable to the 
threat of the withdrawal of law from life in a relation of exception. 
For the remainder of this chapter I will be arguing that sacrifice zones constitute a space of 
legal abandonment, where the state manifests its power over the lives of those within by 
withdrawing itself. As such, I argue that the sacrifice zone is in continuity with the 
biopolitical dynamics that Agamben identifies as being exemplified by the concentration 
camp.  
3.5 Sacrifice Zones and the Production of Bare Life 
In what ways could the existence of the kinds of sacrifice zones described at the beginning 
of this chapter be considered analogous to the camps as understood through Agamben’s 
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theory of homo sacer? To answer this question it would first be helpful to consider the ways 
in which these two spaces are dissimilar.  
1. Social sacrifice zones lack the geographical specificity of a camp. Camps are clearly 
demarcated from non-camps, with a clear inside and outside being marked by 
fences. Sacrifice zones on the other hand are more fluid and are not designed and 
planned in the same way as a camp (indeed, they are often not recognised as spaces 
by the state at all). 
2. While social sacrifice zones are sites where a high level of structural violence takes 
place, they are not designed directly in order to enable state violence in the way that 
concentration camps are (although, as will be argued, state violence is a central 
feature of sacrifice zones). 
3. The sacrifice zones that I have described in this chapter are, in a significant way, 
products of a blurring of the line between state and economic/corporate interests as 
opposed to the totalitarian context of the camps where the state had a direct control 
of economic forces. Sacrifice zones are often produced by the ‘free movement’ of 
capital, where industry either leaves areas once they become unprofitable or create 
an uprooted workforce in search of new employment opportunities in remote areas.   
4. Those within the social sacrifice zones have not been de-nationalised and still (at 
least nominally) are bearers of the rights of citizens of the states in which they live.  
While these differences in juridical nature and historical context are highly significant, there 
is indeed a topological similarity between the camp and the sacrifice zone. For the purposes 
of this study the fundamental structural similarity between camp and sacrifice zone lies in 
the fact that both constitute an internal border within the nation-state marked by the 
withdrawal of the protections of both land and people ordinarily associated with belonging 
to the political community. While this stripping of legal identity is made more explicit in the 
context of the camp (whether it be the Nazi concentration camp, or indeed the refugee 
camps of Manus Island and Nauru), those caught within sacrifice zones become functionally 
denationalised; that is, while they may remain citizens, those who inhabit sacrifice zones are 
marked by a lack of recognition of political subjectivity and access to government services. 
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However, this withdrawal of the state from sacrifice zones does not mean that those within 
are free from governmentality or state power. Indeed, as will be shown, the legal 
abandonment of these areas is often paradoxically coupled with highly invasive forms of 
biopolitical control. As such, as is the case of the camp, the abandonment of life by law 
within the sacrifice zone does not imply the removal of state power over life, but the 
exposure of life to ever increasing forms of biopolitical domination. 
These dynamics of legal abandonment and biopolitical control within sacrifice zones are 
demonstrated by social scientist Silvia Grinberg in her study of the shantytowns of Buenos 
Aires.42 Within these areas huge portions of the population are abandoned to extreme 
poverty and exploitation. Approximately 20 percent of the population of Buenos Aires 
reside in shantytowns and yet these spaces appear on no official government maps.43 
Indeed, one of the defining features of such shantytowns is that the occupants have no 
legally recognised claims to their residency and exist under the constant threat of eviction 
without recourse to law despite generations of habitation.44 These spaces represent an 
exception to juridical norms, and yet, at the same time, they have been included into the 
juridical order and normalised. The residents of these shantytowns exist in something akin 
to a relation of exception to the juridical order, included into the state only by way of 
existing in a physical community that has no legal existence.45   
Grinberg describes this relation of exception through the distinction between ‘authorisation’ 
and ‘permission.’ The space of the shantytown is ‘permitted’ to exist, and yet it is not 
‘authorised.’46 This lack of authorisation stems from the ad hoc nature of its occupation.47 
Many of the larger Shantytowns were first occupied as refuges for the local Indigenous 
peoples from colonial soldiers who were engaged in a program of forced labour and sexual 
exploitation (the areas that made up the shantytowns were marshlands that Spanish cavalry 
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Colonialism, ed. Marcelo Svirsky and Simone Bignall (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 204–25. 
43 Grinberg, “Colonial Histories,” 206. 
44 Grinberg, “Colonial Histories,” 213. 
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46 Grinberg, “Colonial Histories,” 213–4. 
47 Here Grinberg distinguishes between ‘occupation’ and ‘settlement.’ ‘Settlement’ refers to the legitimate occupation of 
an uninhabited area with the permission of a juridical body whereas simple ‘occupation’ is the ad hoc use of space without 
concern for the necessary conditions of settlement.   
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could not traverse).48 They then became semi-permanent stopping off points for industrial 
workers who would live in makeshift shelters temporarily while they looked for work in 
large urban centres.49 Once workers had enough money they would then move over into 
working class suburbs. However, as the industrial boom slowed these sites ceased to be 
mere transient spaces, but instead became a permanent home for generations of families 
who found themselves unable to enter into the dwindling labour market.50  
The fact of being permitted, but not authorised is one of the defining features of life within 
the shantytown. Indeed, the lack of state authorisation is frequently deployed as a 
justification for the legal abandonment of those within. As Grinberg observes, the law most 
frequently appears within the shantytowns as a negation, that is through exemptions from 
regulations that would ordinarily apply to things like sanitation, town planning, property 
rights etc.51 One of the clearest examples of this dynamic can be seen in the manner with 
which the shantytowns access their water supply.52 Within Buenos Aires water is supplied 
by the state-owned public utility company and yet the shantytowns (having no legal 
existence) are not serviced by this company. Instead, the main water line is left open in 
close proximity to the shantytown so that residents can gain access to the water 
themselves.53 Residents organise elaborate networks of hoses from the pipeline to the 
town. Yet serious health issues arise from this practice as water quickly becomes 
contaminated due to the makeshift nature of the apparatuses that are created for dispersal 
(usually a series of rubber hoses strapped together).54 Here the state permits access to 
water, but does not authorise it and so, arguably, absolves itself from legal culpability. 
The same dynamic can be seen in the creation of the large open-air dumping sites that are 
one of the central features of the shantytowns. These sites violate numerous government 
regulations, and yet provide residents with one of the few opportunities within the 
shantytowns to generate an income through the salvaging of scrap.55 Grinberg even records 
an interview with a salvager who was told by a government official that, while he could not 
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receive a government salary, that he was to make sure that the dumping site remained 
contained and as safe as possible and in return the residents would be free to continue their 
salvaging work.56 In this instance, we see the state offering remuneration for labour which is 
in the public interest in the form of continued permission.57 This permissiveness without 
authorisation enables the state to maintain their arms-length relationship to the 
shantytown and by doing so highlights the exceptional status of the shantytown as a 
juridico-political space.  
These shantytowns, like the camps, are localisations of the exception, where the exception 
becomes normalised. And yet, they are also spaces that have unique historical, legal and 
economic contexts. In what way can these spaces help elucidate the relationship between 
legal abandonment and the social sacrifice zone as a broader category?  
As has been stated the shantytown is constituted by the appearance of the state in the form 
of a negation, that is through the de facto suspension of legal norms. And yet, the examples 
given thus far could be read as a practical effort by the state to enable provision for the 
basic needs of segments of the population such as money, shelter, and water in light of the 
fact that the state lacks the political and economic means to provide for these needs in ways 
that conform to legal norms.58  However, the withdrawal of legal norms within sacrifice 
zones can be seen as much in the denial of care-and as such the legal abandonment of the 
natural life of residents-as in the extrajudicial access to goods that I have thus far described.   
The poverty, deprivation and violence of social sacrifice zones is as much a manifestation of 
the withdrawal of the biopolitical state from certain geographic pockets of national territory 
as the exemptions from regulations that exist within some shantytowns. Sacrifice zones 
represent areas where a segment of the population is de facto set outside the category of 
rights-bearers, where the state forgoes its mandate to care for the natural life of the 
population. 59  This withdrawal of care from certain areas and groups creates a rupture in 
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the body politic with certain groups belonging fully to the political community and others 
experiencing the state primarily as a negation.60 As will be shown, one of the ways in which 
the state seeks to remedy this rupture is through the sporadic violent appearance of the law 
within the sacrifice zone.    
In Means Without End, Agamben demonstrates the implied polarity that emerges through 
the constitution of a body politic or ‘People.’ As Agamben highlights, the term ‘people’ has 
in modern European languages two conflicting meanings. On the one hand, it has 
historically been used to refer specifically to those within a political community who are 
impoverished and to a greater or lesser extent, disenfranchised. On the other hand, it is also 
used to refer to the body politic as a whole (i.e. ‘we the people’). As such, the term is 
simultaneously one that designates both those who by definition are included in the body 
politic and those who find themselves on the margins of it. Agamben identifies modern 
politics since the French Revolution as marked by attempts to remove this polarity and to 
produce one single sovereign ‘People.’ The ongoing presence of a ‘people’ (the poor and 
downtrodden) within the ‘People’ (the undifferentiated body politic) highlights what 
Agamben calls a ‘fundamental biopolitical fracture’ within modern politics.61 Those who 
cannot be integrated become an embarrassing presence and a contradiction to the basic 
goal of contemporary politics; to create a single biopolitical body:  
‘From this perspective, our time is nothing other than the methodical and implacable attempt to fill 
the split that divides the people by radically eliminating the people of the excluded. Such an attempt 
brings together, according to different modalities and horizons, both the right and the left, both 
capitalist countries and socialist countries, which have all been united in the plan to produce one 
single and undivided people – an ultimately futile plan that, however, has been partially realised in 
all industrialized countries. The obsession with development is effective in our time because it 
coincides with the biopolitical plan to produce a people without fracture.’62 
Sacrifice zones are a scandal to contemporary politics because they constitute spaces 
inhabited by a people within a People. And yet, they are also one way that the state is able 
to deal with this fracture through its localisation and quarantine. By creating spaces where 
groups and individuals are so radically othered by the sheer deprivation of their conditions 
the identity of the People-proper becomes reinforced through the exclusion and isolation of 
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those within the sacrifice zones. Furthermore, sacrifice zones afford an opportunity for the 
violent appearance of the state and invasive forms of biopolitical control through 
emergency interventions and by so doing help to reinforce the necessity of both the state 
and the ongoing work of colonialism. Indeed, this is why race becomes one of the main 
determining factors in the production of sacrifice zones. Racial minorities pose a threat to 
the project of homogenisation that is so central to contemporary politics, while at the same 
time the otherness of such minorities also provides a justification for what Benjamin refers 
to as ‘law-making and preserving violence’. We shall now turn to examine the race dynamics 
of sacrifice zones as we focus specifically on the inclusive exclusion of Indigenous peoples 
within colonial states and the role that sacrifice zones play in this process.   
3.6 Race, Aboriginality and Sacrifice Zones 
In Chapter One I introduced some of the ways in which racial minorities, particularly within 
the US, face a disproportionate burden of the negative health effects of the production of 
goods and energy, and because of this are far more likely to live within industrial sacrifice 
zones. In Chapter Two I discussed the ways in which sites of cultural and historical 
significance to Indigenous Australians are comparatively under-protected by law and are 
routinely desecrated through industrial practices within Australian society. Furthermore, at 
the beginning of this chapter I highlighted the fact that areas of legal, economic and political 
abandonment are over-represented in Indigenous areas within colonial states. I now turn to 
examine the ways in which these over-representations of ethnic minorities can be 
understood as a structural feature of sacrifice zones.   
As Naomi Klein stated in her 2016 Edward W. Said London Lecture ‘you can’t have a system 
built on sacrificial places and sacrificial people unless intellectual theories that justify their 
sacrifice exist and persist.’63 In one sense, the structural racism that sacrifice zones seem to 
demonstrate could be straightforwardly explained through the existence of an underlying 
white supremacist ideology in Western politics and economics. Yet this would still leave 
open the question of the mechanisms and structures that exist which perpetuate the 
process of othering and exclusion that make social sacrifice zones both possible and, to a 
greater or lesser extent, permissible in the eyes of the body politic. In identifying these 
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mechanisms and structures it is worth considering the ways in which Indigenous 
communities are simultaneously included and excluded by colonial states and the way in 
which this relationship produces areas of both legal abandonment and biopolitical control.  
In offering a post-colonial reading of Agamben’s theory of homo sacer, cultural theorist 
Mark Rifkin proposes a third category of ‘peoples’ to be added to the binary of 
people/People discussed in the previous section. Indigenous peoples are not, according to 
Rifkin, reducible to the disenfranchisement and degradation of the ‘people’, but instead 
constitute a unique form of fracturing of the body politic within the colonial state.64 This is 
because the otherness of Indigenous peoples (to the law and the body politic) is constituted 
through their placement within cultural and political structures that proceed the existence 
of the nation state which asserts a claim over such communities while simultaneously (in 
the North American context at least) affirming their existence as semi-autonomous legal 
structures with unique relationships to land and territory. As such, in order to adequately 
analyse the inclusive exclusion of Indigenous peoples within the sovereign order this 
relationship must be read both biopolitically as well as geopolitically. This is because what is 
included into the sovereign order through its exclusion is not just the bare life of individuals, 
but also pre-existing territorialities and political structures. 
US constitutional law presents Native peoples as occupying an exceptional space within the 
juridical order – one that is not fully autonomous from US law – while at the same time 
being recognised as distinctive legal communities.65 In Agamben’s terms they are exceptions 
that are normalised and have been included into the law. Throughout a number of cases 
brought before the Supreme Court, jurists struggled to find language to adequately describe 
the ‘peculiar’ relationship between the US government and the Indigenous communities. 
For example, Cherokee Nation vs Georgia (1831) described the ‘Indian’ population as having 
an ‘unquestioned right to the lands they occupy.’66 However, their existence within the 
territorial bounds of the United States meant they could not be treated in a manner 
analogous to that of a foreign nation and were instead to be considered ‘domestic 
dependent nations.’67 US vs Kagama (1886) described Native Americans as having the power 
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of ‘regulating their internal and social relations’ but as not having the status of sovereign 
nations.68 According to Oliphant vs Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978), through their submission 
to US sovereignty ‘Indian tribes’ forgo the right to prosecute non-Indigenous peoples 
according to Indigenous law.69 As such, while the US government recognise Indigenous law 
as an existing authority, the US would determine the scope and application of this law 
within the national boundaries of the US.70  
Within these cases we see Indigenous peoples described as having societal and cultural 
norms, laws, territorial boundaries and even nationhood. But these structures are at the 
mercy of the overriding legal structures of the US constitution. The US Constitution both 
grants Indigenous communities juridical and political otherness while at the same time 
incorporating them into the nation state. Rifkin refers to this dynamic as producing a form 
of territoriality called ‘bare habitance.’71 ‘Bare habitance’ is a geopolitical equivalent of 
Agamben’s conception ‘bare life’ which marks the inclusion of pre-existing forms of 
territoriality and political structure into the superstructure of the colonial state while 
stripping them of the status of sovereign, self-determining communities. This parallels the 
inclusion of life into politics (discussed above) where life is included into law only by way of 
its relation of exception – its being included through its capacity to be subjected to the 
withdrawal of law. Just as the inclusion of life into law makes the bare life of individuals 
vulnerable to the stripping of its political, religious, and moral significance, the inclusion of 
pre-existing Indigenous polities into the colonial state presupposes the capacity of the 
colonial state to determine the scope of the application of Indigenous law and to determine 
the contexts and boundaries in which such laws will come into effect.   
But it is not only within colonial states that this dynamic can be identified. Within all political 
communities there exists forms of solidarity, interdependence, and association that both 
precede and supersede the relationship between subsets of the community and the nation 
state. These forms of community can be based on class, race, sexual orientation, or religion. 
The state must deal with these divergent forms of polity in two ways if it wishes to produce 
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a single biopolitical body; either liquidating the members of these associations, or 
incorporating these forms of association into the broader structure of the state.  
The legal abandonment of sacrifice zones is one of the ways that the state is able to carry 
out the incorporation of both alternative forms of polity and individual lives into the juridical 
order. By both affirming the existence of these types of community and abandoning them to 
social and legal decay, the colonial state is able to present itself as a necessary civilising 
force, all the while demonstrating alternative forms of association to be failed cultural and 
political projects. One of the clearest examples of this process can be seen in the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response Act 200772 (known widely as the Northern Territory 
Intervention), where both Aboriginality and Indigenous law were tied implicitly and 
explicitly to societal and cultural collapse.73 
The Northern Territory Emergency Response included a raft of policies and interventions in 
response to the 2007 ‘Little Children are Sacred Report.’74 This report highlighted the 
prevalence of child sexual abuse as well as domestic and family violence within some of the 
Indigenous communities of the Northern Territory. The Emergency Response involved: the 
suspension of the practice of Indigenous law; the suspension of aspects of the Racial 
Discrimination Act, 197575; the increase of police presence within Indigenous communities; 
the limiting of physical access to certain communities, the banning of alcohol and 
pornography; a series of controls placed on welfare payments; as well as the suspension of 
numerous Indigenous community development programs that were deemed to be 
ineffective.76   
What makes the Emergency Response so pertinent to the present study is the ways in which 
rhetoric concerning Aboriginality and Indigenous cultures was deployed throughout the 
intervention to present the state as a reluctant but necessary saviour of Indigenous children 
due to the inherent regressiveness of Indigenous polity. Furthermore, the reported cultural, 
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social and legal collapse of these communities became a justification for a series of 
biopolitical controls. Alissa Macoun described this rhetoric as having 3 distinct features:  
1. The implicit tying of child abuse causally to Aboriginality. The consequence of this is 
that the discursive authority of Aboriginal communities in matters of self-
determination is limited and, furthermore, calls for cultural sensitivity or reflexivity 
can be rejected as implicating opponents of the intervention in continued child 
abuse. Here a 2007 senatorial address from Cory Bernardi is illuminating:  
‘There is a national emergency is confronting the welfare of Aboriginal children, and the well-
meaning intentions of the past have become a trap rather than a solution. Values, virtues and 
societal norms have broken down in a slurry of alcohol, pornography, lawlessness and excuses. 
The time for self-serving excuses is over. Breaking the cycle requires dramatic action and drastic 
changes.’77  
‘The well-meaning intentions’ Bernardi refers to are those that prioritised the 
maintenance of Indigenous self-governance and cultural identity. The function of 
such an utterance is to present these sentiments as propping up inherently broken 
forms of polity.78  
2. The placement of Aboriginality within the historical narrative of white culture. That 
which is Aboriginal is tied to the past, while the economic, legal and political 
structures of the colonial cultures are presented as the teleological forces of history. 
This justifies the need for settler control while simultaneously presenting the 
collapse of Aboriginal communities as an inevitable outworking of the historical 
process. This understanding of the historical positioning of Indigenous and colonial 
forms of community underlies comments such as those of Senator Eggleston: 
‘I believe that Indigenous culture has been used to throw a cloak over these problems and that, 
in this day and age, it is time for this cloak to be removed and for the Indigenous people of 
Australia as a whole to be brought into the world of contemporary Australia.’79  
Here the ‘world’ of Indigenous Australia and the ‘world’ of contemporary Australia 
represent two epochs. The solution to the social conditions of the Indigenous 
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communities is the subsumption of the Indigenous world by that of the settler 
state.80 
3. The presentation of Aboriginality spatially. Certain locations are presented as being 
the expressions of ‘authentic’ Aboriginality while others are presented as spaces of 
‘threatening disorder.’ Within this context the intervention is presented as re-
asserting settler authority over its territory and in doing so both redeeming the 
idealised image of the Aboriginal while bringing civilisation and order to retrograde 
communities. Malcom Brough utilised this form of rhetoric succinctly in his address 
to the National Press Club focused on the Emergency Response: 
‘We can talk about land rights, we can talk about permit systems or we can actually deal with the 
difficult core issues of children being raped, babies with gonorrhoea, children having their 
absolute hearts ripped out by people who are meant to have authority, and we can say no 
more.’81   
Here land rights are presented as being tied to the continued practice of child 
molestation. The complete subsumption of Indigenous territoriality into the broader 
territoriality of the nation-state is therefore the only way of adequately dealing with 
the degeneration of Indigenous spaces.82  
Within this rhetoric geopolitics and biopolitics come together. The protection and 
maintenance of life is used as a justification for the incorporation of pre-existing political 
structures and territories into the juridical order of the nation state. The lawlessness of 
these sacrifice zones in the sense of both legal abandonment and prevalence of crime aids 
the state in the process of forming a single political body. This process is threefold: 
1. The demarcation of spaces occupied by entities that threaten the creation of a 
unified body politic due either to their disenfranchisement (being ‘people’) or their 
representing alternate forms of polity (being ‘peoples’). These spaces are 
demarcated precisely through legal abandonment, that is, through inadequate 
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access to goods and services associated with belonging to the nation-state in which 
they reside. 
2. The presentation of the conditions which appear due to legal abandonment as an 
intrinsic characteristic of the people within the sacrifice zone, whether such people 
are differentiated based on race, class, religion or some other form of identity or 
polity.   
3. The appearance of the state within these areas in the form of state violence or 
biopolitical control. 
Through this dialectic the state is able to make the exceptional space of the sacrifice zones 
one of the ways in which it reasserts its claim over the bare life of the population and to 
disrupt any competing forms of solidarity, territoriality or association which threaten the 
construction of a political body. In this way Agamben’s model of homo sacer can help us 
understand the relationship between sacrifice zones and sovereignty as well as the 
relationship of the biological life of those within sacrifice zone and law. Sacrifice zones are 
places that have been rendered sacred, set outside the legal community and exposed to 
violence and degradation. Furthermore, they are localisations of the exception, yet even in 
their exceptionality they are incorporated into the juridical order of the state. 
As I have argued these dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, norm and exception Agamben 
sees as stemming from the originary relationship of life to law found in the person of homo 
sacer. This inclusion of life into law and came to the fore in modernity in a new way with 
changing conceptions of political subjectivity and biopolitical techniques which exposed life 
to the possibility of a radical withdrawal of the law in a relation of exception. But does the 
inclusion of creaturely life into politics necessitate sacrifice or can bare life constitute a site 
of political resistance and emancipation? We shall address this question as I conclude by 
discussing the communicative possibilities of creaturely life.       
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Conclusion 
Towards a Biopolitics without Sacrifice: Letting the Body Speak Back 
In the preceding chapters I have presented several lines of argument linking the 
politicisation of zoē with the creation of sacrificial places and sacrificial people. I would like 
to conclude this study by exploring the ways in which a politics concerned with care for 
bodies and bodily life might be redeemed through embracing a communicative dimension 
of bodily life which does not view zoē as inert matter that can only be related to – politically 
speaking – as the object to bios’ subject. This potentially emancipatory form of biopolitics 
affirms the body as the bearer of meaning and the site of its own sense-making. In 
presenting this view I shall be drawing primarily on the work of theologian, and former 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams.  
In advocating for an alternate reading of the relationship between bodily life and politics, I 
do not intend to negate the critiques of biopolitics offered by figures like Agamben and 
Arendt. After all, such accounts of the politicisation of zoē have great explanatory power in 
accounting for the ways in which contemporary legal, political and economic orders produce 
sacrificial people and places.  
However, life, the body, and politics are now inextricably bound together in such a way that 
one cannot easily imagine an alternate political and economic status quo without 
dismantling the fundamental conceptual and material apparatus of late modernity in both 
its political and economic modes. As such, a way of viewing the body itself as a political 
actor and agent seems necessary in order to resist the types of political abandonment thus 
far described.  
Furthermore, the political technologies and developments that figures like Arendt, Foucault 
and Agamben critique have also contributed to the alleviation of untold amounts of human 
misery; be it through the implementation of universal healthcare programs, international 
collaboration for the eradication of diseases, infant mortality, extreme poverty etc. It is 
difficult to imagine how these things could have been achieved without, at some level, both 
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the individual bodies of those within a politico-economic order, as well as the life of whole 
populations, were not incorporated into the machinations of economics and politics.  
And yet, unless one wishes to make the purely utilitarian argument that the blood of those 
martyred within the sacrifice zones is simply seed for the soil of global health and wealth, 
then in it would be necessary to envision a form of politics that recognises the centrality of 
the body to contemporary politics while mitigating the sacrificial the impulse toward 
sacrifice that the theorists discussed thus far have described.  
Here I believe Williams account of bodily life as intrinsically communicative and therefore a 
potential the site of political agency and resistance can be of use.  By embracing a view that 
sees the body as communicative – that lets the body speak – we might begin to think of a 
politics that affirms and recognises the dignity of creaturely life while eschewing the 
sacrificial tendencies that seem to be bound so intimately to the subjection of life to law and 
the politicisation of bodies.   
4.1 The Body as Political Actor 
In early 2017 large scale protests began to take place across Bolivia in response to the 
longstanding economic and social degradation of people with disabilities within Bolivian 
society. Nearly 200 protesters with a range of disabilities engaged in a series of often violent 
clashes with police, with the state attempting to disrupt gatherings with water cannons and 
pepper spray. Among the most striking images coming out of this series of actions was that 
of a row of activists suspended from a bridge by their wheelchairs, demanding simply to be 
seen by their political community.1    
In 2013 Russian President Vladimir Putin was confronted by a group of bare-chested women 
activists who were protesting, among other things, the systematic subjugation of women by 
what they saw as an oppressive patriarchal theocracy.2 Of course, the exposure of women’s 
breasts is a relatively common deliberate act of political resistance against patriarchy. An 
example that is perhaps more telling, however, is the way in which the exposure of 
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women’s breasts, say in the context of breastfeeding a child, is perceived by some as a 
political act regardless of the intentions of the person to whom the breasts belong. An 
example of this phenomena in the Australian context can be seen in the vitriol directed 
towards Greens senator Larissa Waters when she dared to nurse her newborn child during a 
sitting of parliament.  
In 2015 the body of 3-year-old Syrian refugee Alan Kurdi was found washed up on a Turkish 
beach. The image of this boy’s body huddled over in the sand appeared on the front page of 
almost every major news outlet in the Anglophone and Continental world. Even typically 
anti-immigration publications featured stories on Kurdi – taking on an uncharacteristically 
humane register in their depictions of the plight of children and families in Kurdi’s situation. 
Very quickly (though it must be said, briefly), discourse around the issue of asylum seekers 
changed with figures like (then) UK Prime Minister David Cameron making calls for deeper 
compassion for refugees.3             
In each of these instances we see the body functioning – intentionally or unintentionally – 
as a political actor. In the instance of the people with disabilities clashing with police in 
Bolivia, we see a group that has been systematically alienated from public life and denied 
the basic privileges associated with belonging to their political community presenting their 
bodies to the public and in doing so demanding a basic recognition of their existence. 
Furthermore, by allowing themselves to become objects of state violence these people 
dramatise the structural violence that has been inflicted on them throughout history. In 
doing this the sheer presence of their bodies becomes a testimony to an underlying political 
conflict within the polis, and as such the sheer fact of their bodily presence becomes 
communicative.  
In a similar way, the topless women protesters in Russia can be read as dramatising the 
objectification and subjugation of women by the patriarchal state. By making themselves 
the deliberate object of the male gaze such an act both subverts and dramatises the 
gendered power relations of contemporary Russian society.  
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But what of the seemingly innocuous act of breast feeding in a public place? How could such 
an act be interpreted as a political one regardless of the intentions of the person nursing? 
Here Arendt’s account of the oikos and polis described in Chapter Two becomes relevant. As 
we have seen, the oikos, according to the traditional demarcations of the Western political 
tradition, stood in contrast to the polis. The oikos was a realm of bare life, the provisions of 
those needs most basic to humanity’s animal existence such as nutrition, reproduction, and 
the raising of children. Only once free from the bonds of necessity through the labour of 
women and slaves could the aristocratic male engage in what was considered the most fully 
human form of life – that of the political actor. By relegating a behaviour so intimately tied 
to the rearing of children and – very often to womanhood and motherhood – to the 
household, women are both denied the possibility of a public identity and, perhaps more 
strikingly, breastfeeding becomes a symbol of the privation of women that has been so 
foundational to Western political institutions and theory. By refusing to participate in this 
relegation to the private, the physical presence of the person breastfeeding becomes a form 
of embodied political resistance and action. This dynamic – of the body taking on a 
dimension of political resistance – is made all the more obvious when one looks at the steps 
taken to normalise breastfeeding in explicitly political contexts such as sittings of 
parliament. In such a case, women who breastfeed in parliament (for example) demonstrate 
through bodily action an unwillingness to allow their participation in childrearing and 
reproduction to exclude them from action in the public sphere or from the creation of a 
public identity.  
Finally, as in the instances of the Russian women and the disabled protesters mentioned 
previously, the body of Alan Kurdi became an agent of political communication and 
resistance. In particular, his body dramatised and made a spectacle of the violence and 
bloodletting inherent in the maintenance of borders in the face of displaced and uprooted 
peoples. Kurdi’s body communicated to the West what inhospitality to, and rejection of, the 
refugee looks like. Kurdi’s body demonstrated that the border is at once a biopolitical and a 
thanatopolitical phenomenon. That is, borders demonstrate a capacity of the state to deny 
political identity and to reduce to people to bare life, while at the same time representing 
the power of the state to let die. By being confronted with the body of a small boy who died 
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as a result of the protection of borders, the public is forced to question the violence that is 
tied to the maintenance of national boundaries. 
 In previous chapters I have offered a rather cynical reading of the politicisation of bodies, 
linking this relationship to, among other things, the transformation of citizenship to a form 
of consumerism, and the exposure of the individual to the threat of the withdrawal of law 
and the stripping of legal and moral significance. However, in the above examples we have 
seen the potential of bodies to be sites of resistance, rather than just subjugation, once 
their communicative dimension is recognised. How can this dimension of bodily life be 
affirmed without further entangling the body in the biopolitical dynamics described so 
cogently by thinkers like Agamben, Foucault and Arendt? In concluding, I wish to gesture to 
an answer to this question in the recalibration of rights language as advocated by theologian 
Rowan Williams, which focuses on the moral ontology of the body itself.  
4.2 Williams and MacIntyre on the Limits of Rights Discourse 
In his essay “Do Human Rights Exist?” Williams explores the critique of rights discourse that 
Alasdair MacIntyre engages in throughout his book After Virtue. MacIntyre, while seeing 
human rights as something of a useful legal institution, is critical of the function that rights 
language holds in contemporary moral and political discourse, viewing such discourse as 
part of the moral incoherence stemming from the rise of nominalism and the decline of the 
virtue tradition as a result of the European Enlightenment. According to MacIntyre ‘…there 
are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.’4 The 
term ‘rights’ – along with the term ‘utility’ – have come to function as key touchpoints in 
political and moral discourse due to the flattening out of moral discourse MacIntyre sees as 
endemic to modernity.  
For MacIntyre, part of the incoherence of rights discourse in the context of both moral 
philosophy and political praxis is that rights are appealed to as a form of moral or political 
conversation-stopper with little by way of rational justification other than appeal to mere 
intuition. Even Ronald Dworkin, a stalwart defender of rights discourse, acknowledges that 
the rational basis for the existence of rights is thin but argues, in light of this, that the lack of 
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proper rational justification for rights does not imply their non-existence; an assertion that 
MacIntyre sees as tantamount to question-begging.5 
MacIntyre, along with Williams, also adds that there is a fundamental conflict between the 
two most basic concepts of modern political and moral thought: ‘rights’ and ‘utility’. The 
former pointing to the inviolable autonomy of the individual and the latter to the priorities 
of administration. This conflict between the autonomous individual – promised by 
Enlightenment ethical and political thought – and the administrative state – distributing 
goods according to principles of utility – is at the core of much modern and post-modern 
anxiety around the assault on the individual by the bureaucratic state.6 
For MacIntyre, rights – as they are deployed in contemporary legal and political discourse – 
are fundamentally no more than a mass of assertions with the state acting as arbiter and 
guarantor of competing claims. However, because the language of rights is itself meant to 
be the beginning and end point of political discussion, the bureaucratic state is left with 
little by way of mediating concepts in the negotiation of competing rights claims. As such, 
the state is left without the moral language to distinguish between fundamental rights – 
such as ‘the right to life’ – and presumably subsidiary rights – for example ‘the right to a 
paid holiday’ – and therefore must revert to managerialism rather than to a robust moral 
and political foundation for political institutions and law. Without a ‘thick’ conception of the 
purposes or telos of rights, according to MacIntyre, the fundamental political activity of 
recognising what is owed to a member of a political community (or to humanity for that 
matter) is in danger of being reduced to sheer proceduralism.7  
Neither MacIntyre nor Williams seek to do away with rights language in favour of a type of 
transcendental absolutism. Rather, their fear – along with theorist like Arendt – is that the 
loss of mediating concepts in political and moral discourse – be they provided from culture, 
history or tradition – can only further absolutise the authority of the managerial and 
bureaucratic state.8    
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Williams argues that the language of rights needs to be redeemed precisely because of its 
centrality to contemporary politics, suggesting that this can only be done by providing a 
robust account of the moral ontology of the individual as rights bearer. In particular, he 
seeks to advocate for such a foundation by considering the individual’s relationship to their 
body as the site of their communicative existence and sense-making.9 
4.3 Williams on Embodiment in the Christian Tradition 
Williams takes, as his starting point in offering an account of the communicative dimension 
of bodily life, the centuries-long controversy surrounding the Church’s relationship to the 
institution of slavery. As he points out, from the time of the writing of the Church’s founding 
documents – such as the letters of Saint Paul – the Church had an uneasy relationship to 
slavery. On the one hand, it was taken for granted as a social and economic norm. Yet even 
within these texts there were also clear contradictions between fundamental Christian 
doctrines and the existence of slave-master relationships, especially within Christian 
communities.10 Of primary significance here is the baptismal identity of each believer which 
marks both master and slave as the slave of God. Because both master and slave are equally 
servants of the divine, the earthly master is accountable to the heavenly master for the 
treatment of the slave. Much of theological ethics as it pertains to the issue of slavery 
throughout Christian history is focused on this core issue of theological anthropology – what 
limitations do the individual’s relationship to the divine place on the use of their body by 
another human being?11 
It is important to note here that these issues fundamentally shaped the sanctions that the 
Church and the Christianised Roman Empire placed on the use and misuse of a slave’s body. 
While Stoic thinkers would sometimes argue that the master had no power over the mind of 
the slave, Christian ethics was focused sharply on the inviolability of the slave’s body. For 
this reason, the murder of a slave would become punishable by law (though penalties 
remained woefully small), and the master would no longer have free sexual access to their 
slaves as had been the norm in the classical world.12 
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11 Williams, Faith in the Public Square, 152. 
12 Williams, Faith in the Public Square, 151–2. 
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In subsequent centuries, largely through an influence of Aristotelianism, Christian ethical 
reflection on slavery focused particularly on the potential violations of the natural ends of 
the body. For thinkers like Aquinas, while the individual could justly be compelled to obey in 
matters external to the body, it was against natural and divine law to compel an individual 
to obey in matters related to the body’s teleology. For example, a person could not be 
commanded to starve to death, forbidden to marry and rear children, or prevented from 
freely choosing between marriage and celibacy.13 
What grounds this understanding of bodily integrity in relation to its ends is the Thomistic 
refusal to separate the soul and body as independent entities. Because, in such a view, the 
violation of the body entails the violation of the soul, one cannot talk of the body in 
proprietary terms without the risk of becoming guilty of trading in souls. According to 
Williams (following Aquinas), one cannot own a body, even if that body happens to be one’s 
own. This is because of the unique nature of one’s relationship to their body. Unlike all 
other objects, one cannot exchange their body, acquire more than one body, nor survive 
their body’s death. But more basically the body is the site of one’s communication, 
meaning-making and sense-making. If there is such a thing as a soul – that is, the 
overarching, coherent whole of the self – then it is precisely the body that makes the soul 
possible. As Williams states ‘The body… is the organ of the soul’s meaning: it is the medium 
in which the conscious subject communicates, and there is no communication without it.’14 
To care for the body therefore entails embracing it as the vessel of a process of sense-
making, and conversely, the most dehumanising form of subjugation would be one whereby 
a person was forced to, in their body, bear the meaning of another – to become the 
instrument of another’s sense-making. ‘Rights,’ according to Williams, must be grounded in 
the freedom of the individual body to communicate its own unique meaning, to express 
through word and gesture what it most truly is.15 Furthermore, Williams argues that a 
central litmus test for when a person’s fundamental rights are being violated is whether 
their body is being forced to bear messages and meanings that are not of themselves.  
                                                 
13 Williams, Faith in the Public Square, 151–2. 
14 Williams, Faith in the Public Square, 152. 
15 Williams, Faith in the Public Square, 157. 
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Williams observes that the most extreme practices of institutionalised dehumanisation are 
accompanied by programs designed to supress the communicative dimension of bodily 
life.16 Most obviously, this is done through confinement – whether in a prison or a camp. By 
being denied the possibility of engaging with the reality of the sheer bodily presence of 
those who are confined, one is prevented from being confronted by the possibility of a 
recognition of the body of the confined as the site of an interiority analogous to their own. 
However, the prevention of speech – in lieu of the possibility of physical confinement – can 
also serve this function. Here one might recall the vitriol expressed towards the ABC for 
allowing the appearance, on Q and A, of Zaky Mallah,17 a terror suspect who spent 2 years in 
a maximum-security prison prior to his acquittal. By allowing such a figure to speak – to 
share their own experience of suffering under the state – the ABC was diminishing our 
capacity to dehumanise Mallah and the group we are meant to associate with him (that is, 
brown-skinned Islamic people). Once the possibility arises that the types of people that we 
wish to subject to state violence and cruelty may be sense-making creatures such as 
ourselves then the legitimacy of state violence against them might begin to wane.  
4.4 The Communicative Body and the Sacrifice Zone 
For Williams, rights are grounded in the body as the site of a person’s sense-making and 
self-disclosure. Such a foundational moral concept as this is necessary to both mediate 
between rights claims and prevent such claims from becoming mere assertions to be 
negotiated by the state’s juridical system. By affirming the rights of the individual, we are 
not simply guaranteeing a list of entitlements, but rather creating the context for their own 
sense-making and preventing the subjugation of the body to the sense-making of another.  
For the purposes of this study this is vital for the preservation of the body as the potential 
site of political resistance. Once the body enters into the political realm it is in danger of all 
of the forms of subjugation that have been discussed in the previous chapters. If the body is 
to speak back to political power and law it must be done within the context of a political 
community that has an underlying value for the body as a communicative and sense-making 
entity – attributes that bind and limit the political community in the ways in which it treats 
                                                 
16 Williams, Faith in the Public Square, 153. 
17 Brian McNair, “Managing the Mallah Fallout: Q&A Under Scrutiny,” The Conversation, July 12, 2015, 
http://theconversation.com/managing-the-mallah-fallout-qanda-under-scrutiny-44556. 
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the body. And yet, such a commitment cannot be limited to mere non-interference. If the 
body is to have the emancipatory power to overcome the politics of sacrifice that I have 
described, the political community must have the positive obligation to see and hear the 
bodies that it is most inclined to relegate to the obscurity of the sacrifice zone.   
Sacrifice zones are fundamentally places inhabited by those we do not wish not see, and 
whose bodies are forced to be the means of the meaning-making of others. Such people 
may be members of ethnic or religious minorities who exist in the minds of mainstream 
culture as caricatures or stereotypes rather than unique individuals attempting to make 
sense of their existence like all others. Here, media and journalistic representation is key as 
the body politic must be exposed to the faces of minorities themselves rather than an 
ideologically constructed picture of them which justifies their sacrifice. Alternatively, the 
sacrificed may be those whose bodies are poisoned by the industrial practices that produce 
commodities to be consumed by the wider society. By allowing the body of another to be 
compromised so that the consumer can generate an identity though their patterns of 
consumption, those within industrial sacrifice zones are, as Williams would put it, being 
forced to become the vessels of the meaning-making of others. A politics without sacrifice 
can only be achieved once we let the bodies that we compromise – through our legal, 
commercial, industrial, and economic practices – speak back to us. This is a process that can 
only commence once such bodies are allowed, first and foremost, to be seen. 
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